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Contractlaw has progressed and evolved sounderprinciplessince the days
of ritualistic and formalistic sealed instrument requirements.1
I.

SALEs LAW AND THE CURRENCY BAZAAR

The cheerful evaluation of contract law by the Court of Appeals in
V'Soske v. Barwick is stunningly naive. At least one important branch of
contract law, sales law, may be ill-equipped to serve the needs of the modern international financial marketplace. In the global currency bazaar,
banks, corporations, investors, and governments buy and sell foreign currency from one another. Their transactions are conducted on tenuous
legal grounds. 2 Fundamental issues of the scope of sales law and the enforceability of contracts are unresolved.
Perhaps if the currency bazaar were economically insignificant it
would not matter whether sales law served the needs of foreign exchange
traders. This bazaar, however, is the world's largest financial market. At
the end of an average day, roughly $1 trillion worth of currencies has
changed hands. 3 This figure represents a 35 percent increase in turnover
in just three years (1989-92). 4 Hence, explosive growth, as well as enormous size, is a salient feature of the bazaar. Moreover, the currency bazaar
never closes. 5 At any time of the day or night millions of U.S. dollars are
1. V'Soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921
(1969).
2. For an overview of foreign exchange transactions, see Raj Bhala, Risk Trade-offs in the
Foreign Exchange Spot, Forward and Derivative Markets, 1 THE FINANCIER 34 (1994); ROGER M.
KUBARYCH,
3.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS IN THE UNrTED STATES (rev'd. ed. 1983).

MONETARY & ECONOMIC DEP'T, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (BAsLE, SWITZERLAND),

CENTRAL BANK SURVEY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET Acrwv IN APRIL 1992 1, 5-6 (1993)
[hereinafter, CENTRAL BANK SURVEY]. In April 1992, the total reported gross turnover in spot,

forward, and derivative foreign exchange contracts was $1.354 trillion. (After correcting for
double counting and estimated reporting gaps, the figure was $880 billion.) Id. at 6 tbl. I; see
alsoJames Blitz, AU Change in ForeignExchanges: The Nature of the International CurrencyDealing
Has Altered, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 2, 1993, at 17.
4. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 6 tbl. I.

5. See Scott E. Pardee, Internationalizationof FinancialMarkets, 72 ECON. REv. (Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Mo.), Feb. 1987, at 3, 3 (noting that "[iln the 1970s, foreign
exchange became a 24-hour market, with the major banks dealing with each other each day
through their offices in the markets in the Far East (Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore) the
Middle East (once Beirut, now Bahrain), then Europe (London, Frankfurt, Zurich), and
finally, the United States (New York for interbank trading and Chicago for futures trad-
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traded for Japanese yen, millions of German marks are exchanged for
French francs, millions of English pounds are sold against Swiss francs,
and so forth.6 The buy and sell decisions of banks, businesses, and institutional and individual investors establish exchange rates. In turn, the exchange rates critically influence the international flow of goods, services,
and money. The currency bazaar is too big, growing too rapidly, and too
important to the international economy to ignore.
7
This important bazaar, however, has been ignored by legal scholars.
Because foreign exchange trading raises fundamental contract issues, this
neglect must end. A legal assessment of the needs of foreign exchange
market participants is required, not only by the participants themselves,
but also by judges and regulators who are trying to cope with a small but
increasing number of breakdowns in foreign exchange trading.
Of course the participants expect to find currency trading profitable;
otherwise they would channel their resources into a different financial
market. Yet, participants can no longer dismiss the breakdowns as isolated
incidents in their race for profits. Formal adjudication results from mishaps that involve high monetary stakes; but when a bank, business, or investor goes to court or to a regulatory agency over a foreign exchange deal
gone sour, they get little comfort. Judges and regulators are groping.
They do not know whether to apply sales law to the transactions, and if so,
which sales law should be used. Judges and regulators do not know
whether the transactions are enforceable. Worst of all, they do not have a
conceptual framework for dealing with these issues.
This article attempts to fill the large and dangerous void in legal
scholarship on foreign exchange transactions. It further seeks to provide
a conceptual framework for judges and regulators that will help them resolve problems in the currency bazaar. It addresses two fundamental contractual problems that arise in the currency bazaar under Article 2 of the
ing.)"). Technically, the trading week begins in New Zealand on Monday morning at approximately 8 a.m. and ends in New York on Friday at approximately 5 p.m. While trading
volumes are thin at other times, it remains possible to find counterparties with which to enter
into foreign exchange transactions.
6. The five most widely traded currencies are the dollar, mark, yen, pound, and Swiss
franc. The percentage of turnover accounted for by these currencies are 82, 40, 23, 14, and
9, respectively. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 9 tbl. 11(a).
7. With the exception of a fifteen year-old student Note, law reviews are largely devoid
of articles on commercial law problems associated with foreign exchange transactions. See
Michael L. Manire, Note, ForeignExchange Sales and the Law of Contracts: A Case For Analogy to
the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1173 (1982). This Note asserts that Article 2
should apply to foreign exchange transactions, yet provides no theoretical basis for the assertion. See id. at 1174, 1188, 1192, 1200, 1206, and 1209. The Note fails to account for the
highly significant fact that conversations between parties negotiating and concluding foreign
exchange transactions typically are tape-recorded. It incorrectly suggests that all foreign exchange transactions are confirmed in writing: See id. at 1186-87. As page proofs of this article were being prepared, a brief article on foreign exchange transactions and Article 2
appeared. See Stephen C. Veltri, Should Foreign Exchange Be "Foreign"to Article Two of the Uniform CommercialCode?, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 343 (1994). This welcome addition to the literature provides an excellent review of relevant pre-U.C.C. cases. It does not advocate a
particular approach, like the pragmatic strategy argued for herein, to the issue of the scope
of Article 2, nor does it dicuss the statute of frauds.
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Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). First, should the scope of sales law
cover foreign exchange? Second, should oral foreign exchange contracts
be enforceable despite the statute of frauds?
This article proposes that these questions be answered using a pragmatic strategy which emphasizes the needs of foreign exchange market participants in relation to Article 2. The pragmatic strategy identifies an integral
relationship between the problems of scope and enforceability in order to
ensure that sales law does not impinge on the vitality and dynamism of the
currency bazaar. Thus, according to this proposed strategy, the resolution
of the first problem hinges critically on the outcome of the second
problem.
Courts and regulators have failed to cope adequately with the problem of scope. Courts have adopted a "carelessly inclusive" approach. Regulators, most notably the Federal Reserve, 8 have used an "aggressively
exclusive" approach. Instead, an examination of the key rules of Article 2
in the context of the currency bazaar is needed before the problem can be
resolved. The statute of frauds is such a rule. How it functions in the
currency bazaar is a critical indicator of whether Article 2 should govern
transactions in this bazaar.
Currently, courts and regulators misguidedly adhere to what is best
termed the "tangibility paradigm"-the fixation on a tangible document
to satisfy the statute of frauds. The paradigm should be abandoned because it does not serve the needs of the currency bazaar. It is a strict approach to the problem of enforceability that clashes with the telephonic
technology of the bazaar. It is also incongruous with the repeat-player,
high-trust culture of the bazaar. Legislative amendments to, or a judicial
re-interpretation of, the statute of frauds is needed. Unless these changes
are made, the pragmatic strategy suggests foreign exchange transactions
may be appropriately excluded from the scope of Article 2. In that event,
other commercial laws, considered below, may be applicable. 9
By no means is the thesis advanced herein limited to the foreign exchange market. The underlying and general theoretical question is at
what point is it appropriate to codify a market or industry? The foreign
exchange market is a case study of this question. Recently, Professor Raymond T. Nimmer set forth three criteria to determine when a market is
ripe for codification: the area of the contract (i) achieves national scope
(the nationality criterion); (ii) affects substantial commercial volume (the
volume criterion), and (iii) would benefit from codification instead of
common law governance (the relevance criterion). 10 Because the pragmatic strategy suggests that market needs must be examined, the strategy
appears consistent with the relevance principle. Moreover, the foreign exchange market clearly satisfies the nationality and volume criteria. The
8. Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, the "Federal Reserve" refers to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
9. See infra notes 218-235 and accompanying text.
10. Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and ReinvigoratingArticle Z 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1337, 1367-73 (1994).
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problem then becomes one of the relative weight to be given to the criteria. If two of Professor Nimmer's criteria are satisfied, is the conclusion in
favor of codification inexorable? Not necessarily. The thesis herein suggests that the relevance principle may be relatively more important than
other criteria. We cannot rush to include or exclude foreign exchange
from Article 2 until we have determined whether the statute "works" for
the market.
There are five remaining parts to this article. Part II sets up a hypothetical but highly realistic foreign exchange transaction. The hypothetical transaction raises the issues of scope and enforceability, and it is used
in parts II1-V to advance the thesis of this article.
Part III considers the scope issue, namely, whether foreign exchange
should be a "good" within the ambit of Article 2. In part III, both the
carelessly inclusive and aggressively exclusive approaches are rejected; but
the pragmatic strategy, which centers on the relationship between contract
enforceability rules and the needs of the currency bazaar, is advanced.
Part IV applies the pragmatic strategy to the statute of frauds issue.
This part highlights the clash between a formal legal approach to the statute of frauds on the one hand, and the way transactions are negotiated
and concluded in the currency bazaar on the other hand. The argument
rejects the tangibility paradigm and advocates changing the statute of
frauds (either legislatively or judicially) to meet the needs of the market.
Even though parts III and IV focus on the application of Article 2 to
the hypothetical foreign exchange transaction, no shortage exists of other
sales laws for judges to apply directly or by analogy. Accordingly, Part V
extends the pragmatic strategy to three other potentially applicable sales
law regimes:' 1 first, the proposed revisions to Article 2 ("revised Article
2"), which are presently under consideration by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute;' 2 second, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"), to which approximately 34 countries are
Contracting States, including the U.S., China, France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Canada, and Australia;' 3 and third, private contract law, specifi11. The common law of contract is, of course, potentially applicable to disputes arising
from foreign exchange transactions. However, there is no question of the scope of this legal
regime; it purports to cover all contracts unless displaced by other law. There is not a common law statute of frauds for the sale of goods.
12. U.C.C. REVISED ARTcICE 2, pts. 1-3, 7 (Tentative Draft Dec. 21. 1993) and pts. 1-6
(Tentative Draft Sept. 10, 1993) [hereinafter, December 1993 Draft and September 1993
Draft, respectively] (on file with author) and Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 2.
Sales (Draft July 29-Aug. 5, 1994) [hereinafter, August 1994 Draft] (on file with author).
13. The United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668 (Final act, entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG].
Documents and summary records of the Conference appear in U.N. CONFERENCE ON CON-

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, U.N. Sales No.
E.82.V.5 (1981). The text of the Conference and reservations taken by Contracting States are
reprinted in Selected International Conventions, 1994 MARTINDALE-HuBBLE INTERNArIONAL
LAw DIGEsr, pt. VII, at IC-29 [hereinafter MARTINDALE-HUBBLE]. The legislative history of the
Senate advice and consent action is found at Proposed United Nations Convention on Contractsfor
the InternationalSale of Goods: Hearingson Treaty Doc. 98-9 Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations,
TRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS,
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cally, the International Foreign Exchange Master Agreement ("IFEMA")
which is a standard-form contract devised recently by banks that actively
trade foreign exchange.14 Part V argues that the IFEMA is unhelpful in
resolving the statute of frauds problem because that contract lacks the essential quantity term. Part V further argues that it may be appropriate to
extend the scope of the CISG and revised Article 2 to cover foreign exchange transactions because these regimes omit a statute of frauds
provision.
Part VI synthesizes the arguments of Parts III-V and draws conclusions
from the application of the pragmatic strategy to the scope and enforceability problems in the currency bazaar.
II.

THE HYPOTHETICAL SPOT TRANSACTION

The foreign-exchange market is one of the world's slickest. It is
screen-based, genuinely internationaland open for business 24 hours a
day. There are many buyers and sellers;
prices adjust rapidly and for the
15
most part smoothly. And it is huge.

United States Senate, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). A list of Contracting States is maintained by
the Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations.
Curiously, even though the U.S. is a Contracting State, no court or commentator has
considered the applicability of the CISG to foreign exchange transactions directly or by analogy. See, e.g., E. Allen Farnsworth, The Vienna Convention: History and Scope, 18 INT'L LAw. 17
(1984); Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAw. 443 (1989); James E. Joseph, Contract
Formation Under the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 Dic,. J. INr'L L. 107 (1984); Courtney P. Smart, Comment,
Formation of Contracts in Louisiana Under the United Nations Convention for the InternationalSale of
Goods, 53 LA. L. REV. 1339 (1993).

14. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MASTER
AGREEMENT § A (1993) [hereinafter IFEMA]. Even though the Foreign Exchange Committee first published the IFEMA in November 1993, it is already being used by foreign exchange market participants in New York, London, and Tokyo. It is not the only example of a
privately-negotiated, standard-form written agreement in the global currency bazaar. In
1992, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) published a revised master
agreement which can be tailored for use in spot foreign exchange transactions by altering
the schedules to the agreement. FXNET, a London-based system for netting foreign exchange trades on a bilateral basis, has issued a Worldwide Agreement.
The IFEMA, however, appears to have the brightest prospects for widespread adoption
by spot market participants. In part, the IFEMA bears the informal imprimatur of the Federal Reserve. The Foreign Exchange Committee (specifically, the Financial Market Lawyers
Group) drafted the IFEMA. This Committee advises and operates under the auspices of the
Federal Reserve. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMrrrEE, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1993) [herein-

after FEC 1992]. In addition, the IFEMA reflects what seems to be commonly regarded as
the best foreign exchange market practice. See FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITTEE, GUIDE TO
THE 1993 INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MASTER AGREEMENT § C (1993) [hereinafter

IFEMA GUIDE]; Ruth W. Ainslie, Foreign Exchange: The New Master Foreign Exchange
Trading Agreements 1, (Apr. 20, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the International Monetary Fund Seminar on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks, Washington,
D.C., May 18, 1994, on file with the International Monetary Fund).
15. The Last of the Good Times?, ECONOMisT, Aug. 15, 1992, at 61.
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The Basic Terms

16
The most basic and common foreign exchange transaction is a spot.
A spot contract involves a commitment by one party to deliver a specified
quantity of one currency against another party's delivery of a specified
quantity of a second currency. In effect, each party is buying one currency
and paying for it with another currency. The date the commitment is
made is the trade date. The value date, which is the date on which the
7
reciprocal deliveries occur, is within two business days of the trade date.'

For example, suppose on November 1 Citibank and the Development
Bank of Singapore ("DBS") enter into a dollar-yen spot foreign-exchange
transaction.18 Citibank agrees to buy 120 million yen from DBS in exchange for U.S. dollars at a price, or exchange rate, of 104 yen per dollar.' 9 Hence, Citibank pays DBS $1,153,846.15 for the yen. Payment of
the dollars, and the reciprocal yen payment, must occur on the value date,
November 3.
16. See CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 16 ("The spot market is still the single
most important segment of the foreign exchange market.").
17. See id. at 16. Thus, in a spot foreign exchange transaction, the settlement of payment obligations is said to occur on "T+2" (where "r" stands for the trade date). Settlement
occurs, however, on T+I in the spot markets for Mexican pesos and Canadian dollars. The
analysis and arguments in this article are equally applicable to a forward foreign exchange
transaction, i.e., one in which the value date is more than two days after the trade date.
18. Citibank is a commercial bank headquartered in New York. DBS is a commercial
and investment bank headquartered in Singapore. The parties are deliberately put in different parts of the world not only to simulate real-world conditions but also to illustrate that
trading in many different currencies occurs far away from the home countries of those
currencies.
Non-bank parties-such as corporations, institutional investors, individual investors, and
governments (mainly central banks)-actively participate in the foreign exchange market.
Inter-bank dealing, however, accounts for 70 percent of total market activity. See CENTRAL
BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 1, 11-12; Manire, supra note 7, at 1183. Of the transactions
between interbank dealers, 41 percent are with dealers located abroad and 29 percent are
with dealers in the same jurisdiction. CENRaAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 11-12.
19. In practice, exchange rates are quoted in more precise terms because finer movements are observed that result in large profits and losses. The dollar-yen rate is quoted in
terms of hundredths of yen per dollar. For example, the rate on Friday, April 15, 1994 was
103.45 yen per dollar. Currency Trading-ExchangeRates," WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1994, at C15.
DBS need not actually possess 120 million yen at the time that it enters into a spot
contract to sell yen. If it did not, it would be short selling-that is, selling foreign currency
that is not held. For an example of selling 400 million pounds short against the dollar, see
ANDREW J. KRIEGER, THE MONEY BAZAAR: INSIDE THE TRILuoN-DoLuLA WORLD OF CURRENCY
TRADING 65-79 (1992). If DBS sells yen short, it will have to obtain 120 million yen to cover
its short position before it is contractually obligated to deliver the yen to Citibank's designated account on the appropriate value date.
DBS could cover its short position in a number of ways. First, it may take a long position
in another spot transaction, for instance, buy yen in the spot market. DBS risks losing money
if the spot rate for yen rises above 104 yen per dollar. Suppose the yen appreciates relative to
the dollar to 103 yen per dollar. Then, DBS will have to buy 120 million yen at the market
rate of 103 yen per dollar and sell them to Citibank at the previously agreed rate of 104 yen
per dollar. The purchase will cost DBS $1,165,048.54, but the sale will fetch only
$1,153,846.15, resulting in a loss of $11,202.39. Of course, DBS would not short sell yen if it
thought yen would appreciate. It expects to profit by buying 120 million yen at, say, 107 yen
per dollar and selling the yen at 105 yen per dollar. A second way for DBS to cover a short
sale is to enter into a foreign currency option transaction. DBS could buy a call option on
yen. This option would entitle DBS to obtain yen at a pre-set price.
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Negotiating the Deal

The dollar-yen spot agreement is reached between foreign exchange
20
traders at Citibank and DBS through direct telephone negotiations.
21
The telephone conversations are tape recorded by each of the parties.
Either Citibank or DBS may initiate the transaction. Assume a Citibank
trader in New York calls a trader at DBS in Singapore. The Citibank
trader asks for "a quote on dollar-yen," but does not necessarily indicate
whether she intends to buy or sell yen.2 2 The custom in the foreign exchange market is to quote "two-way rates," i.e., both the bid and offer
prices. 25 The DBS trader does not learn the Citibank trader's intention
24
until the Citibank trader proposes a specific trade.
Assume the DBS trader tells her counterpart at Citibank that the bidoffer rates are "105-104."25 The Citibank trader indicates a desire to buy
120 million yen. The DBS trader responds "120 million yen, yours, at
104." At that juncture, according to the custom in the foreign exchange
market, the traders believe a spot contract is established for the sale of 120
million yen by DBS to Citibank at a price of 104 yen per dollar. Citibank is
20. See RUDI WEISWEILLER, INTRODUCTION To FoREIGN EXCHANGE 14 (2d ed. 1984) (stating foreign exchange traders may transact by telephone); Thomas M. Campfield & John G.
O'Brien, Foreign Exchange Trading Practices: The Interbank Market, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
HANDBOOK § 2.4, at 3 (Abraham M. George & Ian H. Giddy, eds., 1983) (noting "[m]odem
sophisticated communications" like telephones link market participants).
An alternative way for the Citibank and DBS traders to communicate directly is through
an electronic messaging system. Such computer-to-computer communication requires the
banks to be members of the same automated dealing system. The systems are sponsored by
third-party vendors such as Reuters. About one-third of all foreign exchange deals are concluded through these systems. See CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 21, 24. The effect
of automated dealing on the resolution of the scope and enforceability problems is beyond
the scope of this article.
As an alternative to direct dealing, the Citibank and DBS traders might deal with each
other indirectly through one or more foreign-exchange brokers who act as agents for their
respective principals. See Bhala, supra note 2, at 100. Around one-third of all foreign exchange transactions between inter-bank dealers are arranged through brokers. See CENTRAL
BANK SURVEY, supra note 3, at 21 tbl. VI, 23-24. All telephone conversations between the
traders and their respective brokers, and between the brokers, would be taped. Consequently, the analysis presented herein is unaffected by the use of brokers.
21. Tape recording the telephone conversations between foreign exchange traders is
customary practice in the currency bazaar. Telephone interview with Philip Hemnell, Kim
Eng Securities, New York, N.Y. (June 14, 1994).
22. See KRiEGER, supra note 19, at 31.
23. Because Citibank is willing to act as either a buyer or seller in any foreign exchange
transaction, it contributes importantly to market liquidity. It will take either side of the spot
deal.
24.

See KRIEGER, supra note 19, at 31.

25. These rates are expressed in terms of number of yen per dollar. The bid price of
105 yen per dollar reflects the exchange rate at which DBS is ready, willing, and able to buy
yen. The offer (or asking) price of 104 yen per dollar reflects the rate at which DBS is ready,
willing, an! able to sell yen.
The difference of one yen per dollar between the bid and offer prices is the "spread."
The bid price necessarily must be lower than the offer price. If it were not, then DBS would
perpetually lose money. DBS would buy yen at a higher price and be forced to sell at a lower
price. At the 105-104 rates, a 120 million yen transaction implies that DBS will pay
$1,142,857.14 to buy the yen. The rates also imply that DBS will receive $1,153,846.15 from
selling the yen. The spread assures that DBS can buy and re-sell the yen for a profit of
$10,989.01.
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obligated to deliver $1,153,846.15 to DBS in two days. Conversely, DBS is
obligated to deliver 120 million yen to Citibank in two days. The word
"yours" is the magic trade term indicating entry into a spot contract. 26

After the traders conclude their conversation, each trader fills out a
deal ticket. 27 The ticket states the name or initials of the trader, name of
the counterparty, trade and value dates, type and amount of currency
purchased, exchange rate, and payment (i.e., currency delivery) instructions. Citibank and DBS do not exchange deal tickets. Rather, the tickets
are used by each bank for internal accounting and control purposes, for
example, to monitor the total amounts of yen, dollars, marks, pounds, and
other currencies bought and sold by the bank.
In addition, Citibank and DBS might use the deal tickets as a basis for
preparing written confirmations of the transaction. In many, but not necessarily all, foreign exchange transactions, the parties exchange two confirmations. 28 First, the traders exchange confirmations of the terms of the
transaction by telex. Second, the operations departments of the respective
parties exchange confirmations, usually by mail. 29 This article analyzes
26. After the traders conclude the transaction, employees of the operations department
of each bank may endeavor to confirm the terms of the transaction. Citibank's operations
department may send a written confirmation of the transaction to the operations department
at DBS, and vice versa. Each operations department may check the confirmation received
with its own records of the transaction. These records will include the tape recording of the
transaction, coupled with any written record. Naturally, the written confirmations should
match the records of the deal.
How do Citibank and DBS ascertain the designated account of the other to which the
currencies must be delivered on the value date? The currencies are delivered to designated
accounts of each bank. DBS will inform Citibank of its bank account name and number at
which the dollars are to be delivered, and DBS will inform Citibank of the account name and
number to which the yen must be transferred. The exchange of account information, or
settlement instructions, may occur as part of the written confirmation process. Alternatively,
assuming Citibank and DBS routinely trade with one another, they may have previously exchanged settlement instructions. Finally, Citibank and DBS may have signed a master agreement such as the IFEMA and set forth settlement instructions therein.
27. The telephone negotiation lasts only several seconds or a few minutes. In order to
profit, foreign exchange traders must conclude transactions rapidly for two reasons. First,
foreign exchange rates are volatile even in the short-term. The price quoted on a currency
can move dramatically in seconds. If there is a delay in negotiating a transaction, then a
prospective buyer or seller of a currency may elect not to proceed because exchange rates
have changed such that the originally quoted rate is now an off-market rate, or no longer a
rate at which the transaction would be profitable.
Second, profits are generated by market participants like Citibank, DBS, and their brokers by entering into a large volume of transactions. With respect to highly liquid currencies
like the U.S. or Canadian dollar, Swiss or French franc, Japanese yen, German mark, and
English pound, the bid-offer spread is small. Consequently, a large volume of purchase and
sale transactions are necessary. A smaller number of high-risk trades, such as betting correctly against perceived market trends, are also a source of profits. Naturally, the pressure to
conclude transactions rapidly makes oral negotiation by telephone an ideal means in the decentralized, global currency bazaar.
28. Telephone interview with Philip Hemnell, Kim Eng Securities, New York, N.Y. (June
16, 1994).
29. This department is also known as the "settlements department" or "back office." In
addition to exchanging confirmations, the operations departments exchange payment instructions, usually by electronic means, through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT).
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these confirmations, as
the case where Citibank and DBS do not exchange
30
well as the case where they are exchanged.
C.

The Dispute

Shortly after the deal is concluded, the bid-ask spread moves from
105-104 to 107-106 yen per dollar. The Citibank trader observes that as a
result of short-term volatility, the financial asset (yen) she is buying has
depreciated relative to the currency (dollars) in which she will render payment. Accordingly, she backs out of the deal with DBS and buys 120 million yen from a third bank at the cheaper rate of 106 yen per dollar. 3 ' In
the meantime, the DBS trader has rejected offers from other banks to buy
the yen.
DBS learns of Citibank's unscrupulous action no later than the value
date. At that point, DBS transfers 120 million yen to Citibank but does not
receive the reciprocal payment of $1,153,846.15. The DBS trader insists
on selling 120 million yen at the original exchange rate of 104 yen per
dollar. After all, it relied on Citibank's oral representations and turned
down other opportunities to sell the yen at this rate.3 2 Citibank refuses to
go through with the transaction.
Thus, DBS sues Citibank for breach of contract in the appropriate
federal court. Citibank argues that U.C.C. Article 2 applies to the dispute
and raises the affirmative defense that if there was a spot contract, then it
is unenforceable under the statute of frauds set forth in section 2-201.33
Because there is no signed writing to evidence the contract, Citibank argues, this statute is not satisfied. 34 DBS's response is that the scope of
Article 2 of the U.C.C. does not encompass foreign exchange transactions,
hence the statute of frauds is inapplicable.
The thesis of this article implies that Citibank's defense should be
rejected and, while DBS's response may have some merit, it too should be
rejected. DBS's response is an over-reaction. The pragmatic strategy suggests that whether foreign exchange transactions ought to fall within the
scope of Article 2 depends on a comprehensive assessment of the provisions of Article 2 in relation to the needs of foreign exchange market par30. For the case where confirmations are not exchanged, see infra notes 107-156 and
accompanying text. For the case where confirmations are exchanged, see infra notes 167-216
and accompanying text.
31. At the cheaper rate, 120 million yen cost $1,132,075.41, as compared with
$1,153,846.15 at the original rate of 104 yen per dollar. If the yen appreciated relative to the
dollar, then a dispute could arise because DBS sought to renege on the deal with Citibank
and sell 120 million yen at the new, higher market rate to a third party.
32. Of course, it is not reliance that leads to the creation of a contract; there is a contract here. Citibank and DBS have certain expectations that contract law is designed to protect regardless of the reliance factor.
33. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1990). Throughout this article, unless otherwise noted, the references to the U.C.C. are to the 1990 Official Text, approved and published by the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Note
that Citibank's defense raises the possibility of the judicial admissions exception to the statute of frauds. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (3) (b). This issue is not addressed herein.
34. Citibank does not dispute that a contract was formed. Cf U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (stating
that a contract may be made in any manner, including conduct by the parties).
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ticipants. Examining the statute of frauds in relation to these needs is an
important part of this assessment. The results of the examination, however, cannot be dispositive because there is obviously more to Article 2
than section 2-201. Citibank's defense should be rejected, and the contract enforced, because the statute of frauds does not meet the needs of
market participants. The statute should be modified or reinterpreted to
conform with these needs.
III.

SCOPE-SHOULD FOREIGN EXCHANGE BE A "GOOD"?

Without question the [Uniform Commercial] [Clode was designed to
bring the body of commercial law into the contemporary world of business.... Its principalpurpose35was to meet the contemporary needs of a
fast moving commercial society.
The wisdom of the GeneralElectric Credit decision is lost on courts and
regulators struggling with problems in the currency bazaar. Courts and
regulators understand that sales law is needed to establish precisely the
rights and obligations of Citibank and DBS in the dollar-yen spot transaction. Yet, these decision-makers employ conventional, sequential reasoning to the dispute: first, decide the scope of U.C.C. Article 2; second,
consider the enforceability of the contract under section 2-201. Thus, until the scope of sales law is clear, the risks of engaging in spot transactions
cannot be allocated with precision.
In their haste to establish rights and duties, courts take a carelessly
inclusive approach to the scope issue. Regulators, in contrast, take an aggressively exclusive approach. Both approaches are imprudent. The pragmatic strategy says the conventional, sequential reasoning is rigid. Courts
and regulators should first determine if Article 2 works for the currency
bazaar; in the words of GeneralElectric Credit, does it meet the "contemporary needs of a fast moving" market?3 6 Only then should courts and regulators consider whether the scope of Article 2 ought to include
37
transactions in that bazaar.
A.

The Carelessly Inclusive Approach

Many courts fail to discuss adequately why U.C.C. Article 2 governs
transactions in the currency bazaar. They assume it applies, but provide
scant analysis of the language of Article 2 to support this assumption.
Courts disregard the implications to the foreign exchange market of applying Article 2 to spot transactions.
35. General Electric Credit Corp. v. RA. Heintz Construction Co., 302 F. Supp. 958, 9678 (D. Or. 1969).
36. Id. at 968.
37. A short-cut solution to the problem of scope would be to rely on the first clause of
U.C.C § 2-102 which states, "[u]nless the context otherwise requires." It could be argued that
even if foreign exchange is not a "good," the context mandates the application of Article 2 to
foreign exchange transactions.
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The Five Careless Courts

No fewer than five decisions adopt this carelessly inclusive approach
to the problem of applying U.C.C. Article 2 to foreign exchange transactions. Consider the opinion of a New York appellate court in United Equities Co. v. FirstNational City Bank.3 8 The court decided a claim arising from
a dollar-yen forward foreign exchange transaction.3 9 The parties did not
dispute the applicability of Article 2. The court nonchalantly applied Article 2 without considering whether the transaction involved the sale of
"goods." 40
In Saboundjian v. Bank Audi (USA), a New York appellate court again
neglected to explore carefully the reason Article 2 applies to foreign exchange transactions. 41 There, a bank failed to execute an oral foreign
exchange order from its customer who unreasonably declined to mitigate
his damages. The court asserted that "[t]he Uniform Commercial Code is
applicable to foreign exchange transactions, since 'the Code excludes
"money" only when it is a medium of payment, not when treated as a commodity.' "42 The decision provided no theory for a distinction between
money as the subject of a contract and money as the medium of payment.
In Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., the New York Court of Appeals
considered whether a written confirmation slip of a foreign exchange
transaction is the final expression of the parties' agreement for purposes
of the parol evidence rule. 43 The court baldly stated: "[t]here seems to
44
be no question that the UCC applies to foreign currency transactions."
In Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, S.A. v. IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co.,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York uncritically
Article 2 parol evidence
relied on the Intershoe decision and applied the
45
rule to disputed foreign currency conversions.
Finally, in Koreag v. Refco FIX Associates, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit provided only a sketchy overview of the meaning of
"goods" under section 2-105. This overview justified the court's application of Article 2 to foreign exchange transactions between a New York
corporation, Refco, and a Swiss bank, Mebco. The court granted Refco, as
the seller of U.S. dollars, a right to reclaim the dollars from Mebco, an
38. 383 N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 395 N.Y.S.2d 640 (N.Y. 1977).
39. United Equities entered into a contract on April 12, 1971 for the purchase of 360
million yen against $1,018,710. Under the six-month forward contract, the yen were to be
delivered on Oct. 14, 1971. Between the trade and value dates the Japanese government
declared that non-residents could not open a yen-denominated bank account if they did not
already have one before Sept. 6, 1971. United Equities lacked such an account, and thus it
was unable to receive delivery of the yen. 383 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8. See also discussion regarding
forward transactions supra note 17.
40. See UnitedEquities, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 9-13; cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-102 and 2-105(1) (discussing
the scope of the Article and definition of "goods," respectively).
41. 556 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
42. Id. at 262 n.2 (citing New York Annotations to U.C.C. § 2-105 at 97).
43. 568 N.Y.S.2d 333 (N.Y. 1991); see aso Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Wins Suit on Currency
Deal Am. BANKER, Apr. 2, 1991, at 2. The facts of Intershoe are discussed infra note 193.
44. Intershoe, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (citations omitted).
45. 785 F. Supp. 411, 431 (1992) [hereinafter IBJ]. The facts of IBJare discussed infra
note 202.

1994]

GLOBAL CURRENCY BAZAAR

insolvent buyer.4 6 The court failed to consider whether this remedy is inconsistent with other
provisions of the U.C.C., namely, the receiver finality
47
rule of Article 4A.
Perhaps these courts carelessly applied Article 2 to foreign exchange
transactions because the official commentary thereto sometimes invites application by analogy. Official comment 1 to section 2-105 states that while
investment securities are expressly excluded from the scope of Article 2,
[i]t is not intended by this exclusion.., to prevent the application of a particular section of this Article by analogy to securities
... when the reason of that section makes such application sensible and the situation is not covered by the Article of this Act dealing specifically with such securities (Article 8).48
Judges may reason that even if they are incorrect as a matter of law about
the scope of Article 2, the statute encourages courts to apply it where appropriate by analogy.
Such reasoning is specious. There is no such invitation issued by the
official commentary to judges adjudicating cases involving foreign currency. Moreover, direct application provides parties with the certainty
that the entire statute governs. In contrast, application by analogy empowers the court to pick and choose among the provisions of Article 2. Selective application breeds uncertainty.
46. 961 F.2d 341, 356 (2nd Cir. 1992). In Koreag, Refco engaged in two types of spot
foreign exchange transactions with Mebco. First, Refco bought foreign currency from
Mebco for $7.4 million U.S. dollars. On April 28, 1989, Refco transferred $7.4 million by
wire to Mebco. Second, Refco sold $4.1 million worth of foreign currencies to Mebco in
exchange for U.S. dollars. Between April 28 and May 2, 1989, Refco transferred these currencies by wire to Mebco. Mebco, however, was declared insolvent and closed by the Swiss
bank regulatory authority on April 27, 1989. The closure occurred before Mebco transferred
the foreign currencies Refco had bought for $7.4 million, and before Mebco paid Refco for
the $4.1 million in foreign currencies. Refco sought to reclaim the $7.4 million and the
foreign currencies it had transferred to Mebco. Id. at 344-46.
With respect to the first type of transaction, the court found that Refco was a seller of
U.S. dollars and, therefore, was entitled to reclaim the foreign currencies-the "goods"under U.C.C. §§ 2-310(a), 2-507(2), and 2-702(2). Id. at 355-56. Sections 2-310(a) and 2507(2) are relevant if the foreign exchange transaction is considered a cash sale. U.C.C. § 2310(a) provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, payment is due at the time and place at
which the buyer is to receive the goods. . . ." Section 2-507(2) indicates that "[wihere payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods .... [the buyer's] right as
against the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment
due." The Koreag court found the interaction of these two sections "to create a seller's right
to reclaim goods from an insolvent buyer who takes possession of the goods, but fails to
tender payment" [citations omitted]. 961 F.2d at 356. Section 2-702(2) is relevant if the
transaction is considered a credit sale. The existence of a seller's right of reclamation in the
case of a credit sale is clear from the statutory language; § 2-702(2) states, "[w ] here the seller
discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the
goods upon demand made within ten days after [their] receipt." See also infra note 74.
With respect to the second type of transaction, the court stated that Refco was a buyer of
U.S. dollars and, therefore, Article 2 did not provide a right equivalent to reclamation.
Koreaq, 961 F.2d at 357.
47. See infra note 74.
48. U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 1; see also B.N.E., Swedbank, S.A. v. Banker, 1993 U.S. Dist. Lexis
2699 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 1993) (applying the parol evidence rule of§ 2-202 in a case involving
transactions in debt securities of less developed countries).
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The failure of the five courts to assess carefully the scope of Article 2
cannot be tolerated because the stakes in the trillion-dollar-a-day currency
bazaar are high. A plenary extension of Article 2 to the currency bazaar
must be accompanied by a close reading of the relevant scope provisions
of Article 2. Such a reading suggests the issue is more complex and subtle
than the courts have acknowledged, and that non-conventional reasoning
is needed.
2.

Statutory Ambiguity

The first and most important point to acknowledge is that the language of U.C.C. Article 2 does not clearly indicate whether a foreign exchange transaction is included within its coverage. The starting point is
section 2-102, which provides that Article 2 applies to "transactions in
goods." Nowhere in Article 2 is "transaction" defined. 49 Surely the
purchase of yen and sale of dollars by Citibank qualifies as a "transaction"
as distinct from a "security transaction" governed by Article 9.50 Moreover, the Citibank-DBS deal entails neither the provision of a service nor a
lease of currency.
The lack of such complications has an important repercussion. The
common law has developed the "essence" or "predominant factor" test for
deciding whether hybrid contracts and sale-lease deals are subject to Article 2.51 Problems in deciding whether to apply Article 2 to a hybrid saleservice contract, or categorizing a transaction as a sale governed by Article
2 or a lease governed by Article 2A, do not exist with respect to foreign
exchange transactions. 52 Accordingly, the well-developed commercial law
jurisprudence on these matters is inapposite. Similarly, frequently used
treatises are unhelpful because they dwell on hybrid contracts and salelease agreements. 53 In the currency bazaar, an entirely new approach to
the scope of Article 2, such as the pragmatic strategy advocated herein, is
needed.
The crux of the scope problem, as the Koreag court acknowledged, is
that the subject of a spot foreign exchange transaction (a currency issued
49. There are hints in Article 2 that the drafters meant that a "transaction" is a "sale."
For example, U.C.C. § 2-101 provides that the tide of Article 2 is "[s]ales." Section 2-106(1)
indicates that a "contract" or "agreement" refer to a "sale of goods." Many sections of Article
2 refer to a buyer and seller. Nevertheless, it is curious that the drafters chose the word
.transaction" in § 2-102 instead of "sale."
50. See U.C.C. § 9-102. U.C.C. § 2-102 and the official comment thereto make clear that
a "transaction" does not include a security transaction.
51. This judicially-created test asks whether the sale of a good was the essence of the
contract, or the predominant factor in the transaction, or whether it was merely incidental or
collateral to the provision of a service, sale of real estate, or a lease arrangement. See, e.g.,
Triangle Underwriters v. Honeywell, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the essence of
a contract was the sale of goods and the provision of services was merely incidental to that
sale); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing the predominant factor
test).
52. For a discussion of these problems, see Note, DisengagingSales Law from the Sale Construct: A Proposal to Extend the Scope of Article 2 of the UCC, 96 HARv. L. REV. 470 (1982).
53. See, e.g., JAM.sJ. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-1 at
25-26 (3rd ed. 1988) [hereinafter WHrrE AND SUMMERS].
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by the United States, foreign country, or internationally recognized economic zone 54 ) is not necessarily a "good."55 According to section 2105(1), "goods" are "all things... which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be
paid... 57and things in action."56 Movability is central to the concept of a
'good."
Undoubtedly, foreign exchange in the form of physical currency is movable.5 8 On the value date, Citibank is entitled to receive delivery of 120 million yen in physical currency, and DBS is entitled to get
$1,153,846.15 in physical currency. The yen and dollar notes could be
shipped to the respective parties.
In practice, however, participants in the foreign exchange marketin contrast to a tourist buying foreign currency-do not receive physical
delivery of cash. Foreign exchange is transferred from a seller to buyer by
a funds (or wire) transfer. 59 A 120 million debit in yen is entered electronically to the bank account of DBS, and a corresponding credit is entered to Citibank's bank account. A debit of $1,153,846.15 is made to
Citibank's bank account and a credit of that amount is made to the bank
account of DBS. The transfer of yen and dollars around the world occurs
in seconds. Thus, buying foreign exchange in the interbank market typically involves buying a bank balance, or bank deposit obligation, denomi6°
nated in a foreign currency.
54.

There is an active spot market for the European Union's European Currency Unit

(ECU); thus, it would be incomplete to think only in terms of currency issued by individual
sovereign nations.
55. 961 F.2d 341, 355 ("[a]s a threshold matter, therefore, it must be determined
whether the foreign currencies that Refco and Mebco agreed to exchange were 'goods'
within the meaning of section 2-102.").
56. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (emphasis added). Identification of goods occurs when the contract is made if, as in the hypothetical foreign exchange transaction, it is for the sale of goods
already existing and identified. U.C.C. § 2-501 (1)(a); see also infra note 60. "Money" is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(24) as "a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic
or foreign government as part of its currency." Thus, money is not narrowly viewed as legal
tender, but rather that which has the sanction of government. U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 24.
57. U.C.C. § 2-105 official cmt. 1.
58. Manire, supranote 7, at 1193, 1196 (erroneously stating that foreign exchange transferred through banking channels-by which he presumably means wire transfer-is not
moveable). See also infra note 59 and accompanying text.
59. Funds transfers are more commonly known as "wire transfers." See generaUy Ernest T.
Patrikis, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., and Raj Bhala, Article 4A: The New Law of Funds Transfers and
the Role of Counse4 23 UCC L.J. 219 (1990) (discussing U.C.C. Article 4A, which governs funds
transfers, and other relevant laws, regulations, and private rules).
60. See GLENN G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 401 (F.L. Garcia ed.,
8th ed. 1983). Foreign exchange transactions "are more accurately described as the transferring by individuals or corporations in one country of credits or debits through their banks by
obtaining credits or debits on the books of the banks in other countries that are correspondents or branches of the banks through which the transmission is arranged." Id.
An interesting question is whether foreign exchange is identified to the contract. The
definition of "goods" in U.C.C. § 2-105(1) indicates that the thing is movable "at the time of
identification to the contract for sale." Trading foreign exchange entails entering debits and
credits electronically to bank accounts maintained on computers. In a traditional sense-a
tangibility paradigm-identification might mean that the buyer of foreign exchange withdraws the funds purchased, handles the physical currency, and re-deposits this currency. Arguably, if foreign exchange is not identified to the contract because of its intangible,
electronic nature, then it cannot be a "good" for purposes of Article 2.
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Are movable funds like yen and dollars the "money in which the price
is to be paid" and, therefore, excluded from being "goods"? The official
comment to section 2-105 indicates that foreign currency is not automatically excluded by this phrase:
The exclusion of "money in which the price is to be paid" from
the definition of goods does not mean that foreign currency
which is included in the definition of money may not be the subject matter of a sales transaction. Goods is intended to cover the
sale of money when money is being treated as a commodity but
not to include it when money is the medium of payment. 6 1
The official comment suggests that every foreign exchange transaction
consists of two legs, a "commodity leg" and a "payment leg." The Practice
Commentary to New York's codification of the definition of "goods" reinforces the bifurcation: " 'money', other than the money in which the
price is to be paid, is included in the definition of 'goods': thus a contract
62
for sale of coins or of foreign currency is a contract for sale of goods."
Citibank buys yen and pays dollars. The transfer of yen is the "commodity leg," while the transfer of dollars is the "payment leg." From DBS's
perspective as a buyer, 63 the situation is the reverse: it buys dollars with
yen, thus the dollar transfer is the commodity leg and the yen transfer is
the payments leg. If both parties are viewed as buyers, then there is an
inconsistency in the legs. Accordingly, one party must be viewed as a
seller. 6 4 DBS, for example, sells yen and receives dollars for the sale.
Then, the commodity leg from both parties' perspective is the yen trans65
fer, and the payment leg is dollars.
Nevertheless, the movable yen in the commodity leg may be excluded
from the U.C.C. section 2-105(1) definition because the yen are "things in
action." The Intershoe and Koreag courts neglect to consider this possibility.
Those courts read the definition of "goods" in U.C.C. section 2-105 as if it
stopped with the phrase "other than the money in which the price is to be
paid." A "thing in action" is not defined in Article 2. It "denotes a claim
or right to personal property not in one's possession, as distinguished
from property actually in one's possession." 66 The factual predicate for
61. U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
62. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-105 Practice Commentary note 2 (McKinney 1964) (emphasis
added).
63. A "buyer" is "a person who buys or contracts to buy goods." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a)
(1989).
64. A "seller" is "a person who sells or contracts to sell goods." Id. § 2-103(1) (d).
65. It is not strictly necessary for the transaction to have a purchase price in money in
order to be governed by Article 2. U.C.C. § 2-304(1) addresses barter transactions, i.e., situations where a good is paid for with something other than money. The purchase price "can
be made payable in money or otherwise." U.C.C. § 2-304(1). Because the word "otherwise"
includes any form of consideration sufficient to support a contract, it covers foreign currency. See, e.g., Mortimer B. Burnside & Co. v. Havener Sec. Corp., 269 N.Y.S. 724, 726 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1966). However, viewing the dollar-yen spot transaction as barter instead of a
purchase of yen with money (namely, dollars), or a purchase of dollars with money (namely,
yen) would be inappropriate because both dollars and yen are "money" as defined in U.C.C.
§ 1-201(24). See supra note 56.

66.

GLENN

G. MUNN

ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE

181 (9th ed. 1991).

The above-quoted definition concerns a "chose" in action which is the same as a "thing" in
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classifying yen as a thing in action is intimated above. Citibank is buying a
bank credit (an intangible, electronic bank balance, not physical currency) denominated in yen. 67 As one court put it, "[e]ven when the obligation is performed and the credit established, the customer is only the
owner of an obligation or chose in action and not of any actual foreign
t
money." 8
The rationale in two pre-U.C.C. cases seems to contemplate the distinction between physical currency and things in action. In the 1922 case
of Melzer v. Zimmerman, a New York Supreme Court considered whether
the sale of Austrian currency, kronen, was governed by New York's Personal Property Law ("PPL") as a sale of goods. 69 The contract called for
delivery of physical currency to the buyer. The court stated the contract in
dispute "was an agreement for the purchase by the plaintiff and a sale by
the defendant over the counter of said Austrian kronen in the form of
currency, and not a deposit account payable by such a draft."70 Accordingly, the contract fell within the ambit of the PPL. Similarly, in a 1925
case, Zimmerman v. Roessler & HasslacherChemical Co.,71 a New York appellate court considered whether a contract for the sale of marks involved
"goods" under New York's former Sales of Goods Act. The court observed
that the contract contemplated the delivery of marks, not the credit of
marks to a bank account, because the parties did not specify a time or
action. A "chose in action" is defined in a manner similar to the meaning of a "thing in
action," namely, as "a right of bringing an action or right to recover a debt or money."
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 241, 1479 (6th ed. 1990). Moreover, "chose" is the French word for
"thing." The drafters of the U.C.C. undoubtedly sought to simplify and modernize terminology. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a). "Things in action" are discussed in Alphonse M. Squillante,
Commercial Code Review, 76 CoM. LJ. 42 (1971).
67. See Manire, supra note 7, at 1192 (concluding that foreign exchange transactions
involve the sale of choses in action). Indeed, in 1955 the New York Law Revision Commission stated in its study of the Uniform Commercial Code that:
The more limited exclusion of "the money in which the price is to be paid" is
designed to permit the Sales Article to govern a transaction when, in the language
of Comment 1, "money is being treated as a commodity": a sale of an ancient Roman coin or a modern coin collection. This leads one on the question whether the
Sales Article reaches a transaction for the exchange of dollars into pounds or pesos.
Comment I (fourth paragraph) contains language which supports such coverage.
But the provisions of the Sales Article hardly seemed designed to cope with foreign
exchange transactions; perhaps they would be excluded from the article on the
ground that they do not involve "things... movable" or in any event are "things in
action". [sic]
1 STATE OF NEw YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF ThE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 362 (1955).
68. Samuels v. E.F. Drew & Co., 296 F. 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1924); see also Manire, supra
note 7, at 1192 n.138 (citing other relevant cases). Of course, even if a court decides foreign
exchange is a chose in action, it may well apply Article 2 by analogy. See, e.g., Zamore v.
Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978) (applying the U.C.C. by analogy to a sale of a chose in
action) overru/ed by Bahre v. Pearl, 595 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1991). For scholarly treatments of the
application of the U.C.C. by analogy, see Jane P. Mallor, Utility "Services" under the Uniform
Commercial Code: Are Public Utilities in For a Shock?, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 89 (1980); Daniel E.
Murray, Under the SpreadingAnalogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 447 (1971).
69. 194 N.Y.S. 222, 223-24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 198 N.Y.S. 932 (N.Y. App. Div.
1923). The Melzer court relied on an 1847 decision, Peabody v. Speyers, 56 N.Y. 230 (1874).
70. Melzer, 194 N.Y.S. at 223.
71. 207 N.Y.S. 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept.), aff'd, 148 N.E. 659 (1925).
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bank account for such a credit. Accordingly, the contract was held to in72
volve "goods."
The concept of "things in action" and pre-U.C.C. cases suggest that
the distinction between (1) a bank credit denominated in foreign currency; and (2) physical currency; should determine whether yen (or any
other foreign currency) is a "good" under U.C.C. section 2-105(1). Foreign currency-denominated bank credits are "things in action." Such
credits are rights to the payment of money, and these rights, which may be
bought and sold in the market, are excluded from Article 2. The supporting logic is a strict interpretation of "goods": Article 2 applies only to paradigmatic goods, which in effect are tangible items, not to transfers of
intangible interests such as interests in deposit accounts.
This distinction should not be dismissed lightly. An ill-considered expansion of Article 2 to include purchases and sales of bank credits would
open the door to the inclusion of transfers of claims against insurers, corporate debt (to the extent not covered by U.C.C. Article 8), and accounts
receivable (to the extent not governed by U.C.C. Article 9). The reach of
Article 2 would extend to a far broader array of commercial and financial
transactions than its drafters ever envisioned, and the provisions of Article
2 might be ill-suited to the needs of the many and varied transactors. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed below, the distinction and supporting
73
logic are problematic.
B.

The Aggressively Exclusive Approach

The leading advocate of the aggressively exclusive approach is the
Federal Reserve. For over two years it has acted through the Subcommittee on Payments (Subcommittee) of the American Bar Association's Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code and urged the Subcommittee to
adopt a report calling for the exclusion of foreign exchange transactions
from the scope of U.C.C. Article 2.74 The Federal Reserve's position suffers from four serious flaws.
72. 207 N.Y.S. at 371-72.
73. See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Deputy General Counsel and Senior Vice
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to Members of the Subcommittee on Payments
(Mar. 30, 1994) and the accompanying Outline of Report of Subcommittee on Payments Concerning
the Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to a Foreign Exchange Trade 2-7 (discussion draft,

on file with author); Letter from Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, to Members of the Subcommittee on Payments (Sept. 29, 1993) and the accompanying Outline of Report of Subcommittee on Payments Concerningthe Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to a ForeignExchange Trade 2-4, 9-10 (second discussion draft, on file with author).
See generally Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & James H. Freis, Jr., Resolving Funds TransferDisputes Related to Currency Exchange Transactions: What Law Governs?, Com. L. ANN. (forthcoming).
The key reason for the Federal Reserve's position is a fear that if such transactions are
subject to Article 2, then the receiver finality rule of Article 4A of the U.C.C. will be undermined. Section 4A-405(c) provides that a funds transfer is final and irrevocable upon acceptance of a payment order by the beneficiary's bank on behalf of the beneficiary. U.C.C. § 4A405(c), 2B U.L.A. 532 (1991). Thus, for example, when DBS's bank accepts dollars on behalf of DBS, the credit of dollars to the DBS account is final. The fear arises from the conclusion that under §§ 2-310(a), 2-507(2), and 2-702(2), a seller of foreign currency has a right to
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1. The Stalemate of Pre-U.C.C. Cases
The position relies on outdated, pre-U.C.C. cases-Me/zer and Zimmerman-for guidance in resolving modern-day international commercial
and financial problems. The Melzer and Zimmerman courts were not faced
with a large and rapidly growing global currency bazaar. These courts focused on the difference between accepting physical delivery of currency
and a deposit account denominated in foreign currency payable by a draft
drawn on a foreign correspondent bank.7 5 This distinction is arcane insofar as foreign exchange typically moves from seller to buyer by funds
transfer.
Furthermore, there are pre-U.C.C. cases that plainly support the
proposition that a foreign exchange transaction involves the sale of a
"good" or commodity. Three such cases, Reisfeld v. Jacobs,76 Liepman v.
reclaim currency from a buyer under certain circumstances. See Koreag v. Refco F/X Associates, Inc., 961 F.2d at 356.
The Federal Reserve's fear, however, is unfounded. To say that the payment of the dollar or yen leg of the transaction between Citibank and DBS is final for purposes of funds
transfer law is one matter. To say that the seller of the currency at issue has a right to reclaim
under sales law is a separate matter. There is no inconsistency between the two statements;
rather, they simply reflect different legal effects of certain actions. See Letter from Patricia B.
Fry, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of North Dakota
School of Law, to Raj Bhala, Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law (Nov.
2, 1993) with attached draft letter from Patricia B. Fry to Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Deputy
General Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2-4 (on file with author).
The Federal Reserve's concern that Koreag conflicts with Donmar Enter., Inc. v. Southern Nat'l Bank of N. Carolina, 828 F. Supp. 1230 (W.D.N.C. 1993) is also unfounded. See
Letter from Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Chairman and Deputy General Counsel, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, to Members of the Subcommittee on Payments (Oct. 18, 1993) (on file
with author) (stating that Donmar "adds fuel to the fire because it seems to conflict with
Koreag"). In Donmar, the plaintiff bought 280,000 pounds from Stephen's Trading Corporation ("STC") for $540,680. The plaintiff transferred by wire the U.S. dollars in two installments, the second one in the amount of roughly $524,000, to the Southern National Bank
(SNB). STC received this sum and, in turn, transferred it to a third party. When STC instructed SNB to pay 200,000 pounds to the plaintiff, SNB informed STC that STC's account
lacked 200,000 pounds to make the payment. SNB informed the plaintiff of the insufficiency, and the plaintiff sought to recover the $524,000 it had paid to STC. 828 F. Supp. at
1233-34.
The Federal Reserve's fear of an inconsistency between Donmarand Koreagis unfounded
because the plaintiff in Donmar,in contrast to Refco in Koreag, never argued it was a seller of
dollars under Article 2 and thereby entitled to a right of reclamation. Indeed, no Article 2
provision was raised in Donmar. The plaintiff argued that it had a right to reclaim the
$524,000 under § 4A-207 (which concerns payment orders that do not identify a beneficiary),
and the court properly rejected the argument. Donmar, 828 F. Supp. at 1239.
Two additional concerns might lie behind the Federal Reserve's position. First, reclamation could allow a creditor of a failed bank to circumvent a foreign insolvency proceeding.
Second, reclamation could undermine regulatory efforts to develop systems for netting (or
off setting) foreign exchange delivery obligations among the players in the global currency
bazaar. These concerns, like the fear discussed above, are dubious. See Raj Bhala, Self-Regulation in GlobalElectronic Markets Through Reinvigorated Trade Usages, 31 IDAHo L. REv. (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 33-35, on file with author).
75. See Meler, 194 N.Y.S. at 223; Zimmerman, 207 N.Y.S. at 371.
76. 176 N.Y.S. 223 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919). In Reisfeld, the buyer purchased Russian rubles. At issue was whether the contract of purchase was enforceable under the statute of
frauds in New York's Personal Property Law whose coverage excluded "money." The notes
were issued by the Tsarist government that had been overthrown in the 1917 Bolshevik
revolution and, therefore, could not be used as a medium of payment. The court decided
that because the buyer purchased the notes for resale, they were not excluded from the

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

Rothschild,77 and Richard v. American Union Bank,78 established an intended
use test. They focused on the intent of the buyer of foreign currency to
determine whether foreign currency is a commodity or a means of payment under the relevant statute of frauds. Under the reasoning of these
cases, if Citibank intends to resell the 120 million yen, then the yen are
commodities and fall within Article 2. Alternatively, if Citibank plans to
use the yen in Japan to purchase goods (other than foreign currency) and
services, then the yen are a medium of payment and excluded from the
statute. All three cases held that foreign currency was a commodity subject to the relevant statute. 79 Thus, it is not difficult to line up pre-U.C.C.
cases against, as well as for, the Federal Reserve's position.
Of course, the pre-U.C.C. cases against that position are as outdated
and unworthy of reliance as the cases in the Federal Reserve's favor. For
example, classifying foreign exchange as a commodity versus a medium of
payment based on the buyer's intent raises doctrinal and evidentiary
problems. Should an objective or subjective test be used to determine intention? How should intention be proved? Moreover, the distinction between resale and use as a medium of payment makes little sense. Suppose
Citibank intends to resell the 120 million yen to another bank. Why
should this case be treated differently from a case where a U.S. importer of
Japanese goods buys 120 million yen in order to pay a Japanese exporter
for the goods? Finally, the intended use test suggested by the Reisfeld,
Liepman, and Richard courts is at variance with the plain meaning of
"goods" in section 2-105. The U.C.C.'s definition does not contemplate a
focus on anything other than the immediate transaction.8 0 In sum, the
net result from reviewing pre-U.C.C. cases is an unhelpful and essentially
irrelevant stalemate.
2.

A Formalistic Distinction

The second problem with the aggressively exclusive approach is that it
relies on an overly formalistic distinction-physical currency versus bank
credit-to determine the scope of U.C.C. Article 2. Just because Citibank
statute. Its holding also rested on the characterization of the rubles as choses in action. Id. at
224.
77. 262 S.W. 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924). The contract in Liepman involved the purchase of
marks and the issue was enforceability of the contract under a statute of frauds that covered
goods but excluded "money." Id. at 685. Because the U.S. and Germany were at war, the
court reasoned, the buyer could not have intended to use the marks as a medium of payment. Therefore, they were a commodity within the statute of frauds. Id. at 686.
78. 170 N.E. 532 (N.Y. 1930). This case involved a contract to buy two million
Romanian lei. The contract called for a cable transfer of foreign currency into the buyer's
bank account in Bucharest, but delivery was delayed and the buyer sued for damages. Id. at
533-34. The court held that the transaction was for a commodity because the buyer intended
to resell the lei in the U.S., not spend the money in Romania. Id. at 535.
79. See Resfeld, 176 N.Y.S. at 224; Liepman, 2626 S.W. at 686; Richard, 170 N.E. at 535.
80. Compare U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (defining "Goods" as "all things... movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale.") with Reisfed, 176 N.Y.S. at 224 (noting "that the
rubles were bought for resale") and Liepman, 262 S.W. at 686 (because of the war with Germany, the marks were intended to be a commodity) and Richard, 170 N.E. at 535 (buyer
intended to resell the lei in the U.S.).
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obtains a credit of 120 million yen does not prohibit it from withdrawing
that credit in physical currency. Presumably, unless a buyer and seller
agree otherwise, a buyer of foreign exchange has the right to demand
delivery of physical currency in place of a credit. The fact that Citibank
elects to keep its yen in the form of a bank balance on deposit instead of
physical currency should not affect Citibank's contractual rights and obligations. Citibank's decision is merely one of convenience, economy, and
security. It is easier, cheaper, and safer to store 120 million yen electronically than in bills in a Brooklyn warehouse.
More fundamentally, the scope of Article 2 should not depend on
whether the buyer converted bank credits to cash. If it did, then form
would triumph over substance and form could be manipulated. Citibank
could easily "shop" among legal regimes, opting into or out of Article 2, by
choosing the form of delivery. Only an agreement with DBS that Citibank
would maintain the yen in a specific form would limit Citibank's freedom
to manipulate the legal rights and duties of the parties. A much more
pragmatic evaluation-whether Article 2 serves the needs of Citibank and
DBS-ought to determine the scope of the statute.
3.

The Drafters' Intention

The exclusionary approach may be inconsistent with the intention of
the drafters of the U.C.C. The official comment to section 2-105 clearly
suggests that the drafters intended to include the sale of money as a commodity within the scope of the Article. 8 1 It is not a question of the drafters
failing to foresee foreign exchange transactions-the comment evinces
this foresight. Rather, the drafters did not anticipate that foreign exchange would occur electronically and that it would appear in computerized bank account records. If they had envisioned these developments,
then they might have incorporated a definition of "things in action" to
avoid confusion as to scope.
More generally, aggressively excluding foreign exchange transactions
reflects an intransigence that is inconsistent with the drafters' goal of creating a workable and adaptable statute. They wanted the statute to be
interpreted flexibly and liberally.8 2 Only then could it could be adapted
to new commercial contexts like the currency bazaar.
4.

Underlying Principles

The exclusionary approach may be inimical to the underlying principles of the U.C.C.: simplification,8 3 modernization, 84 uniformity, 85 cer81. See, e.g., New York U.C.C. § 2-105, Practice Commentary, at 94-95 (McKinney 1964);
§ 2-105, New York Annotations, at 97 (McKinney 1964). But see id. § 2-201, New York Annotations, note (1)(a) at 119-20 (McKinney 1964) (stating that the original version of the Uniform Sales Act governed contracts for choses in action but later the Act was amended to
exclude choses in action).
82. See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1; infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
83. U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (a).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 1-102(2)(c).
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tainty,8 6 and support for commercial transactions. 8 7 If foreign exchange
transactions are wholly excluded from Article 2, then they become subject
to non-uniform, obsolete legal regimes, namely, pre-U.C.C. common law
88
Yet, pre-existing sales law was simplified
or non-U.C.C. sales statutes.
Article 2 unified the sales law of vari2,89
and
by
Article
and modernized

ous states. 90 Potentially applying the sales laws of fifty different states renders the law of sales as it pertains to foreign exchange transactions more
91
complex, arcane, and disjointed.

This possibility generates uncertainty for foreign exchange market
participants. Providing a precise and predictable legal framework that enhances certainty for businesspersons is a founding principle of Article 2.92
Taking foreign exchange transactions out of this framework obviously contradicts this principle. Uncertainty is further exacerbated if courts, seek-

ing to keep a foreign exchange transaction within Article 2, manipulate
facts to make foreign exchange more closely resemble a paradigmatic

good.
The drafters of Article 2 sought a sales statute that would foster com-

mercial development. 93 Tossing foreign exchange transactions to the vagaries of non-U.G.C. law may inhibit innovation in the foreign exchange
market.

94

For example, market participants like Citibank and DBS may

face difficulty devising a uniform practice of confirming transactions electronically because many different statutes of frauds potentially apply. The
need to protect ongoing commercial relations is concomitant with the

86. While certainty is not expressly mentioned in U.C.C. § 1-102, the principles set forth
in that section imply increased certainty as to legal rights and obligations. It has been argued, however, that simplification and clarification are fallacious principles, seee.g., Charles
E. Clark, The Restatement of Contracts, 42 YALE LJ. 643, 653 (1933), and costly to achieve. See,
e.g., James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 140, 156-7 (1981).
87. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b).
88. An analogous problem exists for hybrid sales-service contracts and (to a lesser extent
given the enactment of Article 2A) lease contracts. An example of a non-U.C.C. sales statute
is New York's General Obligations Law. See infra note 108.
A tension may exist between providing certainty and predictability for commercial parties through codification, on the one hand, and stifling innovation in a market as a result of
codification, on the other hand. The difficult, time-consuming nature of revising a code-as
the current experience with Article 2 illustrates-reinforces concerns about inhibiting the
expansion of new commercial practices. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. Alces,
Reinventing the Wheel, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1405 (1994).
89. For a discussion of the need to simplify and update sales law, see Arthur L. Corbin,
The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE LJ. 821, 834-5 (1950); Karl
Llewellyn, The General Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1950 N.J. ST. B.A.Y.B. 73, 75.
90. For a discussion of the importance of unifying sales law, see Llewellyn, supra note 89,
at 73.
91. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 68, at 456 (discussing wide variations in non-U.C.C. standards among states).
92. E.g., In re Automated Bookbinding Serv. Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1972).
93. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 89, at 73.
94. For a discussion of how the solar energy industry was harmed by the denial of the
application of the implied warranties of Article 2 to the sale and installation of solar energy
devices, see Harry R. Wright, Jr., Comment, The Sales-Service Dichotomy: A Roadblock to Consumer Acceptance of Domestic Solar Energy Devices, 30 MERCER L. Ray. 547, 552-54 (1979).
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need to support commercial development. 95 Currency bazaar participants
like Citibank and DBS are repeat players-they are well known to each
other and deal with one another on a daily basis. Application of Article 2
may place these relations, particularly with respect to matters of contract
96
formation, on a firm legal foundation.
C.

The PragmaticStrategy

Official comment 1 to section 1-102 aims to prevent U.C.C. Article 2
from aging while maintaining its strength as a foundation for commercial
parties:
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide
its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices. It is
intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to
be developed by the courts in
the light of unforeseen and new
97
circumstances and practices.
The drafters knew subsequent generations of lawyers would face new
transactional horizons. They realized Article 2 would be discarded if it
failed to satisfy the needs of the parties. 98 Thus, they drafted Article 2 so it
could adapt to a variety of contractual contexts that were not overtly contemplated by the
drafters. 99 The statute's style is deliberately "loose" and
"open-ended."10 0 Many of its provisions articulate standards of contract
law and principles of justice rather than specific, technical rules.10 1
Neither the carelessly inclusive approach of the United Equities,
Saboundjian,Intershoe, IBJ, and Koreag courts, nor the aggressively exclusive
approach of the Federal Reserve, heeds the advice of the drafters. The
first approach lacks articulated standards and reasoning. The second approach is rigid. Both approaches neglect new ways of conducting business
and the realistic needs of businesspersons. A new pragmatic strategy is
95. See Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the
Jurisprudenceof Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REv. 213, 230 (1966).
96. One practical mechanism that repeat players can use to avoid a statute of frauds
problem is to waive the statute of frauds defense in a model or master agreement. Strangely,
the IFEMA contains no such waiver. See generally, IFEMA, supra note 14. If it had the waiver,
then the problem would be acute only for non-repeat players, i.e., non-parties to the IFEMA.
97. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1.
98. Indeed, "[tlhe origins of the Uniform Commercial Code lie in the law merchant, a
specialized body of usages, or customs, that governed contracts dealing with commercial matters until the seventeenth' century." 1 E. A.AN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS

§ 1.9, at 34 (1990). The rules laid down in the U.C.C. can be viewed as a reflection of what
the drafters thought was the best market practice of merchants. Not surprisingly, therefore, a
number of provisions of Article 2 impose higher standards on merchants than on other sorts
of parties. Id. § 1.10, at 42-43.
99. SeeWilliam D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial 'Code'Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291,
314 (1962); Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoDs. 330, 333 (1951); see also Farnsworth, supra note 98, § 1.10, at 40-41 (discussing the adaptability of a general body of contract law to many different types of transactions).
100. Grant G. Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl LlfeUyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962); see also
Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL.
L.F. 321, 328.
101. Note, DisengagingSales Law from the Sale Construct: A Proposal to Extend the Scope of
Article 2 of the UCC, 96 HARv. L. RE,. 470, 484 (1982).
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needed to decide whether foreign exchange fits the definition of "goods"
and, accordingly, whether foreign exchange transactions are subject to Article 2. This model gains support from Article 2's invitation to courts and
commentators to consider the needs of commercial parties by expanding
10 2
the scope of the statute accordingly.
Under the pragmatic strategy, the determining factor is whether Article 2 furnishes rules that meet the needs of participants in the currency
bazaar. Insofar as Article 2 serves these needs, it retains its vitality in new
transactional settings. In turn, it promotes certainty in foreign exchange
dealings and the development of the foreign exchange market. Article 2
should be tailored to avoid the undesirable repercussions of applying the
statute of frauds to foreign exchange transactions. Such a revision would
follow the pragmatism countenanced by the drafters of the official com10 3
ment quoted above.
The sine qua non of the pragmatic strategy is the acknowledgment that
foreign exchange trading is inherently fraught with uncertainties and
risks. For example, Citibank buys yen and sells dollars because it expects
yen to appreciate relative to the dollar. There is currency risk-yen could
depreciate and Citibank could lose money on the transaction. Rules of
sales law, such as the statute of frauds, potentially exacerbate the uncertainties and risks associated with foreign exchange trading. Uncertainties
and risks should be minimized.
Put another way, problems that Citibank and DBS might incur in
their dollar-yen deal should be resolved efficiently. Efficiency in the context of the foreign exchange market is a two-dimensional concept involving certainty and cost. Market participants need unambiguous rules
setting forth whether foreign exchange contract obligations are enforceable. The rules should not impose unnecessary transaction costs on the
participants. In sum, rules of contract enforceability that enhance certainty and reduce cost should be the legal cornerstone for wealth-generating foreign exchange transactions. 10 4 To the extent sales law does not
serve as this cornerstone, it should be changed.
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine every provision of
Article 2 from this pragmatic perspective in order to decide c6nclusively
whether the statute ought to govern foreign exchange transactions. The
102. A feature of the pragmatic strategy is that it is designed for cases where it is arguable
whether a transaction should be included within the scope of Article 2. Because real estate
transactions, for example, clearly are excluded, the strategy is inapplicable. But how close is
close enough? There is no attempt herein to set forth criteria as to how persuasive the arguments must be for and against inclusion in Article 2 before the pragmatic strategy should be
used.
103. See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1.
104. Another important goal, appropriate risk-allocation, should be noted. The risks that
the rules address should be allocated between two banks engaged in a foreign exchange
transaction according to a "better position" criterion-the bank that can most cheaply insure
against the loss should bear the risk in question. With respect to the statute of frauds, the
risk that a contract is unenforceable is evenly distributed. Similarly, if the proposals discussed below regarding the statute of frauds are implemented, this risk would be evenly
distributed.
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pragmatic strategy, however, can yield a tentative resolution to the scope
problem within the confines of one article. It can be applied to an Article
2 provision of fundamental importance, the statute of frauds. As Professor
Farnsworth writes, " [i]
t would be difficult to imagine a question more important to a person expecting to make agreements in an unfamiliar legal
system than this: when is a writing required to make an agreement enforceable?"' 0 5 Further, the statute of frauds set forth in section 2-201 has
caused consternation among foreign exchange market participants. How
this section affects the market is an important piece in the puzzle of the
scope of Article 2.
V.

ENFORCEABILITY-DOES THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SERVE MARKET

NEEDS?

Had the statute offtauds been always carried into execution accordingto
the letter, it would have done ten times more mischief than it has done
good, by protecting, rather than by preventing,frauds.10 6
The statute of frauds, set forth in section 2-201(1), states:
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by
way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought
10 7
or by his authorized agent or broker.
105. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.1.
106.

1 WiuiAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAMFS 601 (1844) (quoting Justice Wilmot's con-

currence in Simon v. Metivier); Robert L. Misner, Tape Recordings, Business Transactions Via
Telephone, and the Statute of Frauds, 61 IowA L. REv.941, 942 (1976).
107. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1) (emphasis added). Because of the tense used in § 2-201 (namely,
the words "has been made") it is evident that the statute of frauds does not require that a
contract be in writing; it can be oral. Rather, the statute of frauds requires that a document
exist to provide reliable evidence of the existence of the contract. Otherwise it is not enforceable. See, e.g., Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F. 2d 1178, 1182, 1185 (7th
Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.). This distinction between contract formation and enforceability is
seen in the IFEMA. Section 8.3 of the IFEMA indicates a foreign exchange contract is oral
and that the IFEMA is the written evidence thereof. See IFEMA, supra note 14.
In attempting to show that a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds exists, it is
impermissible to rely on oral testimony. See Monetti, 931 F.2d at 1181; Southmark Corp. v.
Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 767 n.5 (5th Cir. 1988). The writing, however, need not
take the form of a single document. The integration of several documents prepared at different times may satisfy the statute of frauds. See Migerobe, Inc. v. Certina USA, Inc., 924 F.2d
1330, 1333 (5th Cir. 1991); Hunt Oil Co. v. FERC, 853 F.2d 1226, 1241 (5th Cir. 1988). The
writing or writings need not be directed or delivered to the other party, nor do they have to
be made for purposes of satisfying the statute of frauds. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98,
§ 6.7, at 406-07.
The statute of frauds applies prospectively as well as retrospectively. For example, it
applies to future oral modifications of a contract that originally fell within the statute. Also, if
a contract that did not originally fall within the ambit of the statute of frauds is modified, and
the modified contract falls within the statute, then the requirements of the statute must be
satisfied. U.C.C. § 2-209(3).
Some commentators suggest that the statute of frauds does not cover every transaction

that is within the scope of Article 2. See, e.g., 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.6, at 402-03 &
n.5. As discussed above, U.C.C. § 2-102 states that Article 2 governs "transactions" in goods.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text. In contrast, § 2-201(1) quoted above refers to
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If section 2-201 (1) were applied strictly to the Citibank-DBS dollar-yen
spot agreement, then it would be unenforceable.1 0 8 Assuming written
confirmations are not exchanged, Citibank and DBS have nothing to sign,
and clearly the value of the transaction exceeds $500. The tape recording
does not satisfy the
of the telephone conversations between the10traders
9
writing requirement of the statute of frauds.
More generally, all of the foreign exchange transactions in which written confirmations are not exchanged are unenforceable if the Article 2
statute of frauds is strictly construed.1 10 Immediately, then, it is apparent
.contract[s]" for the sale of goods. This reasoning, however, does not appear to have been
widely accepted; hence it seems unlikely that a court would rule that foreign exchange transactions are governed by Article 2 but excluded from the statute of frauds on the basis of the
"transaction"/"contract" distinction.
108. Courts sometimes confuse enforceability with validity. See, e.g., Tri-State Petroleum
Corp. v. Saber Energy, Inc., 845 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that the litigants are
not "asserting that any oral contract is invalid because of the statute of frauds"). A contract is
not void just because it fails to satisfy the statute of frauds. This failure means that the transaction cannot be "judicially enforced in favor of a party to the contract." U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt.
4; see also Glover School & Office Equip. Co. v. Dave Hall, Inc., 372 A.2d 221, 223 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1977) (stating "the beginning premise is that an oral contract is valid and enforceable
unless prohibited or restricted by some statutory provision [such as the Statute of Frauds]").
This result contrasts with that which would be obtained under § 5-701 (a) of New York's
General Obligations Law ("G.O.L."), a non-U.C.C. statute of frauds. The G.O.L. is potentially relevant to the global currency bazaar because the U.S. is one of the three largest foreign exchange trading centers in the world. The three countries with the largest average
daily turnover of foreign exchange transactions are the United Kingdom ($300 billion daily),
the U.S. ($192 billion daily), andJapan ($126 billion daily). Central Bank Survey, supra note
3, at 13-14. Undoubtedly, New York accounts for the bulk of the U.S. activity. Section 5701 (a) of the G.O.L. states that a contract is absolutely void "unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his
lawful agent, if such [contract]... [b]y its terms is not to be performed within one year from
the making thereof." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw. § 5-701 (a) (1) (McKinney 1989). This statute of
frauds would not render a spot foreign exchange contract void because it is performed
within two days. (Nor would § 5-701 (a) of the G.O.L. render a forward foreign exchange
contract void so long as the value date of the contract is within one year. Most forward
contracts are completed in less than one year). Hence, there is a potential conflict between
U.C.C. § 2-201, which renders a spot contract unenforceable, and G.O.L. § 5-701(a)(1),
which does not render it void. Under U.C.C. § 1-103, which states that pre-U.C.C. law is
applicable unless displaced by provisions of the U.C.C., § 2-201 prevails. See H & W Indus. v.
Formosa Plastics Corp., 860 F.2d 172, 180 (5th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the application
of this statute of frauds, see Cathy L. Scarborough, ForeignExchange Contracts: What Statute of
Frauds Applies in New York?, 4 INT'L L. PRAnCCUM 17, 20-21 (1991).
109. See infra notes 117-66 and accompanying text. For a recent discussion of electronic
signatures and the requirement of a signed writing, see Sharon F. DiPaolo, Note, The Application of the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-201 Statute of Frauds to Electronic Commerce, 13J.L. &
COM. 143 (1993).
110. Section 2-201 is not the only statute of frauds in the U.C.C. that would render such
transactions unenforceable. For example, U.C.C. § 8-319 sets forth a writing requirement for
the sale of investment securities. See infra note 130. Similarly, U.C.C. § 9-203 establishes a
requirement for security agreements.
In the context of foreign exchange transactions, U.C.C. § 1-206 could be relevant. It is a
residual, gap-filling provision that covers sales of personal property not otherwise covered by
the aforementioned sections. U.C.C. § 1-206(2) & cmt. U.C.C. § 1-206(1) states that a contract for the sale of personal property is unenforceable beyond $5,000 "unless there is some
writing which indicates that a contract for sale has been made between the parties at a defined or stated price, reasonably identifies the subject matter, and is signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent."
The official comment to U.C.C. § 1-206 states that two "principal gap[s]" are filled by
that section. The first gap relates to the sale of general intangibles as defined in U.C.C. § 9-
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that strictly applying section 2-201 (1) could wreak destructive havoc in the
currency bazaar."' This result indicates section 2-201(1) does not serve
the needs of market participants: no law should threaten the foundations
of an otherwise well-functioning market that is worthy of preservation.
This conclusion is reinforced by the application of the pragmatic strategy-specifically, the analyses of the costs, benefits, and purposes of the
statute-set forth below. 112 Thus, the model calls for the rejection of Citibank's affirmative defense. The model also suggests DBS's response has
merit, namely, that foreign exchange should be excluded from section 2105(1) and thus from the reach of section 2-201(1). This argument, however, cannot yet be accepted.
A.

The Clash of Cultures

There is an uneasy tension between the technology and business practices of the foreign exchange market on the one hand, and the demands
of contract enforceability rules in sales law on the other hand. The technology is telephonic. It expands the ways in which market participants
negotiate and execute currency trades. Communications between Citibank, DBS and the like are not face-to-face meetings in which written
draft contracts are exchanged and marked up by lawyers representing the
106. See also 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.6, at 404. As discussed above, foreign exchange can be categorized as a thing in action. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text;
U.C.C. § 9-106. Section 9-106 specifically includes things in action in the definition of
"[g]eneral intangibles."
The second gap concerns transactions excluded from Article 9 by U.C.C. § 9-104. Section 9-104() of the U.C.C. indicates that Article 9 is inapplicable "to a transfer of an interest
in any deposit account." A "deposit account" covers "a demand, time, savings, passbook or
like account maintained with a bank." U.C.C. § 9-105(e). Certainly, accounts maintained by
Citibank and DBS for foreign exchange trading purposes would be "deposit accounts" excluded from Article 9.
Consequently, contracts for foreign exchange could fall into either or both of the gaps
and thereby come within the ambit of § 1-206. This result is obtained only if foreign exchange is a thing in action and not a good governed by Article 2 and its statute of frauds.
Such a result would not affect the analysis in this article. The same concerns about the
costs, benefits, and purposes of the statute of frauds are relevant to U.C.C. § 2-201 or § 1-206.
Indeed, because U.C.C. § 2-201 requires that a writing contain only a quantity term, while
§ 1-206 requires more, the arguments below apply to U.C.C. § 1-206 a fortiori. Compare
U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 with U.C.C. § 1-206(1). See generaUy Note, The Uniform Commercial Code,
Section 1-206-A New Departurein the Statute of Frauds?,70 YALE L.J. 603 (1961) (comparing the
requirements of § 1-206 and § 2-201).
111. This unhappy scenario has spurred legislative action in New York. Recently, the New
York legislature passed an amendment to G.O.L. § 5-701 that excludes "qualified financial
contracts" from the statute of frauds. Act of July 20, 1994, ch. 467, sec. 1, § 5-701 (b), 1994
N.Y. LAws 467 (codified as amended at N.Y. GEN. OBuG. LAw § 5-701 (McKinney 1994).
Such contracts include spot and forward foreign exchange contracts and currency swaps.
The bill was transmitted to Governor Mario Cuomo for his signature on July 8, 1994. N.Y.A
11513, 215th G.A., 2d Sess. (1994). Similar amendments are proposed in the bill for §§ 1-206
and 2-201, which raises the specter of non-uniformity in New York's U.C.C. vis-a-vis the
U.C.C. of other states. The bill is actively supported by the ISDA, a trade association representing participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets. See Memorandum from
Daniel Cunningham and Catherine Struve to ISDA Board of Directors re: Amendment of
New York Statute of Frauds (June 2, 1994) (on file with author). The ISDA memo is accompanied by a form letter favoring the amendments that ISDA members are encouraged to
send to New York legislators.
112. See infra notes 167-216 and accompanying text.
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parties during endless rounds of coffee and take-out sandwiches. The
trading floors of Citibank and DBS are entirely different from the conventional lawyers' conference room; traders often communicate by telephone. In sum, the deals made in the currency bazaar are oral and are
13
concluded rapidly and informally.'
The statute of frauds must adapt to this telephonic technology. England accepted a similar proposition many years ago. In 1954, the English
Law Reform Committee successfully advocated the repeal of the statute of
frauds, in part because a writing requirement is " 'out of accord with the
way in which business is normally done.' "114 Unfortunately, this proposition has not gained respectability in the U.S. Except for the current noteworthy attempt at revising U.C.C. Article 2, "[t]here has been no serious
movement to abolish the statutes of frauds in this country, though they
have had many critics." 11 5 Foreign exchange market participants might
not reduce their agreements to writing for good reason. Because bid-ask
spreads are thin for trading in liquid currencies, profits are made through
a high volume of trading. To maximize profits, market participants seek
to conclude as many transactions as cheaply and quickly as possible. Outdated legal formalities like the statute of frauds requirements lead to
higher transaction costs and delay the completion of transactions. Not
surprisingly, many market participants prefer tape recordings of conversations among traders instead of written agreements.
The law also must account for the culture of the currency bazaar.
Trust among participants in the foreign exchange market is high. Perhaps
this aspect of business culture also distinguishes the trading floor from the
conference room. The participants repeatedly deal with one another. To
engage in fraudulent or deceptive practices is to invite ostracism: a
trader's unctuous behavior quickly becomes widely known and other traders decide it is risky and imprudent to deal with the rogue trader. In 1966,
an author of a textbook on foreign exchange observed that "[m ] ost dealers with very long experience have never had a single lawsuit arising from
misunderstandings in respect of foreign exchange transactions." 116 The
observation remains true today.
Two variations of the hypothetical spot transaction presented in Part
II will illustrate that the statute of frauds should be reformed or abolished
in the context of the foreign exchange market. In Case One, the telephone conversation between the Citibank and DBS traders is taped. However, no written confirmations are exchanged between the parties. Case
113. Undoubtedly, these features, and the phenomenon of telephonic and computer-tocomputer communications, are found in many other modem markets. Accordingly, the potential applicability of the pragmatic strategy is not limited to the foreign exchange market.
114. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.1, at 371 (quoting UNrrED KINGDOM LAW REVISION
COMMrrrEE ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THE

REPORT, CmD.No.

DocrRINE

OF CONSIDERATION, SIXTH INTERIM

5449, 6-7 (1937)).

115. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 6.1, at 371. Farnsworth is referring specifically to
non-U.C.C. statutes of frauds enacted in most states, but his remark is equally true with respect to U.C.C. § 2-201.

116.

PAUL EINZIG,

A

TEXTBOOK ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE

41 (1966).
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One raises the problem of compliance with section 2-201 (1), the fundamental statute of frauds provision. The problem is solved if section 2201 (1) is judicially reinterpreted or legislatively modified so that tape recordings satisfy the "writing" and "signature" requirements of that section.
In Case Two, the operations departments of Citibank and DBS exchange such confirmations subsequent to the tape-recorded, telephonic
conversation between their traders. This Case raises a the problem of
compliance with section 2-201(2), the merchant's exception to section 2201 (1). It is argued that the microeconomic costs of such confirmations
do not justify the requirement that they be used.
B.

Case One: Tape Recordings as "Writings"
1. The Tangibility Paradigm

Twenty years ago Professor Misner argued that tape recordings
should satisfy the statute of frauds.' 17 His argument, however, is incongruous. He did not advocate that a tape recording be considered a "writing"
for purposes of U.C.C. sections 1-201(46) and 2-201. Instead, Misner argued that the recording's voiceprint should satisfy the "signature requirement of U.C.C. section 1-201(39).118 The real problem with Misner's

argument, however, is that it is disappointingly conservative.
Misner's argument is mired in the tangibility paradigm. This paradigm does not consider the needs of a particular market like the currency
bazaar. The market must fit the law, not the reverse. Most importantly,
this paradigm requires some physically cognizable piece of paper to evidence a contract under the statute of frauds. A " 'voiceprint'-the
graphic output of high-speed sound spectrograph"1 9-meets the requirement. Thus, Misner's argument does not strike at the heart of the statute
of frauds: it will not allow a tape recording alone to satisfy the statute.
Ironically, in trying to cope with telephone business deals, Misner in
effect advocated two writings to satisfy the statute of frauds-the
voiceprint (which would be the "signature") combined with a written
memorandum (which would be the "writing").120 This solution is not only
needlessly cumbersome and costly, but also inapposite to the special technologies and business practices of the currency bazaar. A more radical
and efficient solution is required, whereby the tangibility paradigm is discarded and full legal effect is given to tape recordings.
2.

Possible Legislative Amendments

One such solution-rejected by Misner with little reasoning 12 1- is
legislative action. Two straightforward legislative amendments might be
appropriate. U.C.C. section 2-201(1) states the "writing" must be "signed"
117. Misner, supra note 106.
118. Id. at 942, 945-56, 964.
119. Id. at 946.
120. Id. at 950.
121. Id. at 943-46.
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by the party (or her broker) against whom enforcement of the contract is
sought. Under section 1-201(46), a "'writing' includes a printing, typewriting or any other intentional reduction to tangible form."1 22 A legislative amendment is needed to bring tape recordings squarely within the
meaning of a "writing." The following phrase could be added at the end
of section 1-201(46) to accomplish this goal: "and a tape recording or
123
other recording on magnetic tape."
Under U.C.C. section 1-201(39), "'signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." To ensure consistency with the term "writing" as amended, the
following phrase could be added at the end of section 1-201(39): "and any
statement of a speaker identifying the speaker that is tape-recorded or recorded on magnetic tape."
Amending section 1-201(46) in the manner previously suggested,
however, may be incongruous with the structure of U.C.C. Article 3 and
other non-Article 3 provisions dealing with negotiable instruments. Rules
regarding negotiable instruments are property rules that turn on the physical delivery of a tangible item. Such rules become nonsensical in an intangible world. Accordingly, adjusting section 1-201(46) could do more
harm than good. 12 4 It is wise to consider two other legislative options in
lieu of amending sections 1-201(46) and 1-201(39).
One alternative is to add a definition of "record" in section 1-201.
Indeed, in April 1994 the American Bar Association's Working Group on
Electronic Writings and Notices of the Subcommittee on Electronic Commercial Practices ("Working Group") approved a proposed definition of
"record" that would embrace tape recordings: "'[r]ecord' means a durable representation of information which is in, or is capable of being retrieved or reproduced in, perceivable form. A record may be in writing or
in any electronic or other media." 125 As the Working Group explains:
The term "record" is new. Throughout the Code, numerous
provisions of the various Articles have required parties to communicate in "writing" as defined in Section 1-201(46). Given the
rapid development of electronic and other communication and
storage technologies, the requirement that documents or com122.

U.C.C. § 1-201(46). Obviously, a tape recording is not a "printing" or "typewriting."

It can be transcribed, but then the transcription and not the tape itself is the writing. Moreover, a key feature common to printing and typewriting is that each is readable by the unaided human eye. This feature is not present with respect to tape recordings. See 1 RONALD
A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201:134 (2d ed. 1970).

123. An alternative proposal may be derived from Professor Anderson's argument that a
tape recording is not a "writing" because it "lack[s] the element of being 'readable' by the
unaided human eye which is characteristic of printing and typewriting." 1 ANDERSON, supra
note 122, § 1-201:134 This proposal calls for adding "or on any substance" after the words
"tangible form" in § 1-201(46). Id. Anderson's argument has been criticized by Misner for
citing no authority. See Misner, supra note 106, at 947-48.
124. See Patricia B. Fry, X Marks the Spot: New Technologies Compel New Concepts for Commercial
Law, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 607, 612-16, 622-24 (1993).
125. Letter from Patricia B. Fry, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of North Dakota School of Law, to Raj Bhala, Assistant Professor of Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 5 (June 27, 1994).
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munications be "written" or "in writing" no longer reflects existing or developing commercial practices. Examples of current
technologies commercially used to communicate or store information include, but are not limited to, magnetic media, optical
messaging systems, audio tapes and photodiscs, digital voice
12 6
graphic media.
With the addition of the term "record" to section 1-201, there should be
no need to modify the term "writing." The Working Group's proposal is
gaining acceptance among other American Bar Association committees
charged with studying the revision of the U.C.C. For example, the term
"record" may be used in revisions to U.C.C. Articles 2 and 5.127
Another legislative option would be to change the statute of frauds to
allow parties to vary it by agreement. While freedom of contract is a foundation of Article 2, Citibank and DBS currently are not permitted to opt
out of section 2-201(1).128 Adding a phrase or sentence to section 2201 (1) that would allow them to vary the statute by agreement would pro129
vide the necessary freedom.
3.

Judicial Re-interpretation

A different way of accomplishing the same task would be for judges to
reinterpret sections 1-201(39) and (46) to encompass tape recordings.
While this may be a time-consuming and uneven process, there is a textual
basis for such judicial action. U.C.C. sections 1-201(39) and (46) contain
the word "includes." Because this word does not limit the definition, a
court could reasonably extend the definition to include non-paradigmatic
writings.
Unfortunately, some courts adhere to the tangibility paradigm. These
courts take a formalistic view of tape recordings and, consequently, decide
these non-paradigmatic writings do not satisfy the statute of frauds. For
example, the issue in Swink & Co. v. Carroll McEntee & McGinley, Inc. was
whether a tape-recorded oral contract for the sale of securities is enforcea126. Id.
127. Id. at 2.
128. See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 2 ("[T]he statute of frauds found in Section 2-201 . . . does
not explicitly preclude oral waiver of the requirement of a writing, but a fair reading denies
enforcement to such a waiver as part of the 'contract' made unenforceable .... ."); U.C.C. § 1205 cmt. 4 (referring to the Article 2 statute of frauds as a "mandatory rule... whose very
office is to control and restrict the actions of the parties, and which cannot be abrogated by
agreement, or by a usage of trade").
129. The word "sign" (or "signature," "signatures," "signed," or "signer") appears in
U.C.C. §§ 2-205 (the merchant's firm offer rule) and 2-209 (concerning modification, rescission, and waiver). The word "writing" (or "written") appears in U.C.C. §§ 2-202 (the parol
evidence rule), 2-203 (providing that seals are inoperative), 2-205, 2-207 (concerning additional terms in an acceptance or confirmation), 2-209, 2-316 (regarding the exclusion or
modification of warranties), 2-509 (concerning risk of loss in the absence of a breach of
contract), 2-605 (regarding a waiver of a buyer's objections to a delivery of goods), 2-607
(relating to notice of a claim of litigation), and 2-616 (relating to notice of a material or
indefinite delay). Modifying the statute of frauds as suggested above, or re-interpreting it as
discussed below, is unlikely to upset these other provisions of Article 2. Foreign exchange
contracts are between two parties and neither multiple writings nor signatures are involved.
Thus, the rights and obligations of third parties would be unaffected by the proposals.
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ble under the statute of frauds in Article 8 of the U.C.C.130 The court

assumed that a tape recording is an "intentional reduction to tangible
form" and, therefore, a "writing" under section 1-201(46).131 Nevertheless, the court held that the recording failed to satisfy the statute of frauds
because it was not "signed" by the party against whom enforcement of the
5 2
contract was sought.'
The court in Roos v. Aloi also refused to re-interpret the statutory language to reflect market practice. 135 Again, the issue was the enforceability
of an oral agreement for the sale of stock. 1 4 The buyer argued the tape
recorded conversation of the agreement satisfied the relevant statute of
6
frauds.'5 5 The court rejected this argument in a highly ironic manner.'1
On one hand, the court noted that the parties (two equal shareholders in
a closely-held corporation) were well known to each other. Consequently,
strict adherence to the intricacies and formalities of corporate law was unnecessary.'5 7 On the other hand, the court slavishly followed a single precedent on the statute of frauds, even though the relationship of the parties
and the surrounding facts and circumstances reliably indicated the exist15 8
ence of an enforceable contract.
The facts of the Swink and Roos cases did not suggest that the taperecorded voices were not genuine. Perhaps the courts' decisions were
based on concerns that a voice on tape is more difficult to authenticate
than a handwritten signature. For such courts, reliability is the core of the
statute of frauds "signature" requirement. Obviously, contracts should not
be enforced if it is uncertain whether the defending party assumed contractual obligations; but it is folly to think that authenticating recorded
130. 584 S.W.2d 393, 394-96 (Ark. 1979). U.C.C. Article 8, which governs transactions in

investment securities, contains a statute of frauds in § 8-319:
[a] contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless:
(a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought or by his authorized agent or broker, sufficient to indicate that a
contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities
at a defined or stated price.
U.C.C. § 8-319. The fact that the statute of frauds at issue is U.C.C. § 8-319 does not render a
case inapposite to the analysis of the Citibank-DBS dispute under U.C.C. § 2-201. The critical
terms "writing" and "signed" are used in both sections and defined in exactly the same way in
U.C.C. §§ 1-201 (46) and 1-201 (39), respectively. Moreover, U.C.C. § 8-319 cmt. 1 states that
"[t]his Section is intended to conform the statute of frauds provisions with regard to securities to the policy of the like provisions in Article 2 (Section 2-201)." Indeed, examining cases
arising under U.C.C. § 8-319 for clues about the interpretation of § 2-201 is commonly done.
See, e.g., Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 767 n.6 (5th Cir. 1988).
131. Swink & Co., 584 S.W.2d at 398-99.
132. Id.
133. 487 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 640. Those provisions were U.C.C. § 8-319 and New York's General Obligation
Law. Id. at 642-43; see also infra note 130.
136. Roos, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 642. See supra note 108 for a discussion of the General Obligations Law.
137. Roos, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
138. Id. at 642-43.
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13 9
voices is any more difficult than authenticating a signature on paper.
Indeed, impersonating a voice is probably far harder than forging a signature; hence, a tape recording may well be more reliable than a signature.
Further, the vast majority of foreign exchange transactions, like the agreement in the Roos case, involve repeat players whose voices are well-known
to each other. Certainly the parties introduce themselves to each other
before negotiating a spot foreign exchange deal. Courts that consistently
apply the tangibility paradigm, such as the Swink and Roos courts, never
entertain these considerations.
The court in the Citibank-DBS dispute should avoid this paradigm's
inherently formalistic approach. Instead, it should follow the opinion rendered in Ellis CanningCo. v. Bernsteinand hold that the tape-recorded conversations between Citibank and DBS satisfy section 2-201.140 The facts of
Bernstein closely resemble the disputed dollar-yen transaction. Bernstein
orally agreed to sell the stock in United Packers, a company he owned and
operated, to the Ellis Canning Company. Bernstein and the Ellis Canning
representatives agreed to record the essential elements of the transaction.' 4 ' After the taped conversation, letters and draft agreements were
exchanged between Bernstein and Ellis Canning, though the parties'
agreement was not memorialized in a signed writing.' 42 Subsequently, a
third party offered to buy the United Packers stock at a higher price than
on the deal with Ellis CanEllis Canning had offered. Bernstein reneged
1 43
ning and sold the stock to the third party.

The court rightly rejected Bernstein's affirmative defense that the
contract with Ellis Canning was unenforceable under the statute of
frauds. 1 44 It held that the tape recording satisfied the statute of frauds
writing requirement because the parties had previously agreed in writing
to be bound by the tape recording. 145 The court reasoned that if the parties agreed to bind themselves to a recording of their agreement, then
139. See, e.g., Misner, supra note 106, at 956-63 (discussing the scientific aspects of
voiceprints).

140. 348 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1972). Professor Misner wrongly rejected the Bernstein
decision, discussed below, as too liberal and, therefore, unlikely to be followed in different
jurisdictions in a uniform manner. Misner, supra note 106, at 949-50, 964. A court decision
in one jurisdiction that is squarely consistent with the needs of the market and the technological and business culture of that market, and that makes rational economic sense, should be
an attractive precedent for courts in other jurisdictions. Of course, possibly the best way to
ensure that the Bernstein holding is uniformly adopted is to enact it legislatively. Yet, Misner
rejected legislative solutions. Id. at 945-46.
141. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. at 1215-17.
142. Id. at 1217-20. The letters and drafts are analogous to the written confirmations
discussed in Case Two below. See infra notes 167-215 and accompanying text.
143. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. at 1220.
144. Bernstein unsuccessfully argued that no contract had been formed with Ellis Canning because no meeting of the minds occurred. The court held that all the essential terms
of the stock sale were agreed to notwithstanding certain objections to the structure of the
transaction raised by Bernstein. Id. at 1221, 1225-28.
145. Id. at 1228. While the court characterized this decision as a holding, a more conservative interpretation of the case is possible. The court plainly held that the letters and
draft contracts exchanged by the parties satisfied the writing requirement of U.C.C. § 8-319.
The court stated that it went "a step farther" in deciding that the tape recording, agreed to by
the parties, satisfied the statute of frauds. Id. This step could be regarded as dicta.
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"the contract [was] 'reduced to tangible form' when it [was] placed on the
tape. "146 Similarly, the signature requirement was met because its "clear
purpose ... is to require identification of the contracting party and.., the
identity of the oral contractors [was already] established" on tape.1 4 7 Undoubtedly, the court's outrage at Bernstein's behavior compelled this
holding. After the taped conversation was concluded, Ellis Canning had
provided working capital and management expertise to United Packing.
As a result, the financial performance of United Packing markedly improved. 148 Bernstein took advantage of this improvement by selling his
stock in United Packing to a higher bidder.
In the hypothetical Citibank-DBS dispute, the court benefits from two
additional recent precedents that break away from the tangibility paradigm. In Londono v. City of Gainesville, the court held that a tape recording
of the city commissioner's action at a public meeting satisfied the signature requirement of the statute of frauds. 149 In Color & Design Exchange
Inc. v. Standish, the court held that an oral statement made on the record
in open court satisfies the statute of frauds. 150 The Londono and Standish
decisions reflect a well-placed confidence in the reliability of tape recordings as evidence of a contract that is lacking in the Roos and Swink
opinions.15 1
4.

Certainty

By discarding the tangibility paradigm and enforcing the dollar-yen
spot transaction, a court adjudicating the Citibank-DBS dispute ensures
that the statute of frauds serves the needs of market participants. One
such need is certainty as to the enforceability of spot deals. Knowing that
existing obligations will be enforced, sellers of foreign exchange, like DBS,
can comfortably reject new offers to buy currency. This certainty is particularly important in the volatile foreign exchange market where new offers
are the inevitable result of dramatic, swift changes in rates.
146. Id.
147. Id. But see Swink & Co. v. Carroll McEntee & McGinley, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 393 (1979)
(holding that a tape recording was a "writing," but the "signature" requirement was not met;
hence the contract at issue was unenforceable).
148. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. at 1218.
149. 768 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985).
150. 593 A.2d 169, 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991). The statement was not made by the
party to be charged, Standish, but by the attorney for the plaintiff seeking enforcement of the
contract. The contract involved a personal guarantee made by Standish, the president of a
corporation, for payment of a judgment rendered against his corporation.
151. The Court adjudicating the Citibank-DBS dispute also has the benefit of several
precedents establishing a liberal approach to the signature requirement. See, e.g., Barber &
Ross Co. v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., 810 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823
(1987) (the trademark of a seller satisfied the signature requirement); Procyon Corp. v.
Components Direct, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (a buyer signed a letter of
credit essentially by adopting the signature of the bank that issued the credit); Paloukos v.
Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 588 P.2d 939 (Idaho 1978) (the business name of the seller
printed on a worksheet satisfied the signature requirement); Automotive Spares Corp. v.
Archer Bearings Co., 382 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (letterhead satisfied the signature
requirement); A&G Constr. Co. v. Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547 P.2d 1207 (Alaska 1976)
(typed name was sufficient to satisfy the requirement).
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Fraud Prevention or Fraud Promotion?

A decision in the Citibank-DBS dispute that is consistent with the
Bernstein, Londono, and Standish cases serves a second important market
need-promoting market integrity and preventing fraud. Like Bernstein,
Citibank is asking a court to ratify its unscrupulous behavior through the
statute of frauds. Notions of fairness and justice dictate that the tape-recorded telephone transaction between Citibank and DBS should be an
enforceable contract.1 52 Applying the statute of frauds in this case is at
best a hinderance to achieving a just result. It gives a party like Citibank a
153
legal basis for welshing.
On the other hand, the statute of frauds was intended to prevent
fraudulent claims by thwarting perjured testimony in contract cases and by
generally avoiding "the maladies of fraud and deceit."1 54 As Professor
Llewellyn stated:
The effort of the Code (2-201) has been to deal with the essential
purposes for which the Statute was designed, while getting and
keeping away from the abuses: to wit, to make utterly essential
some evidence in writing and over signature, or else some pretty
good other evidence that rests on something more tangible than
words of mouth. .

.

. [T]he Code adds both the desire and a

reasonable machinery for a businessman to be able to rely on
fact that he has procured a
what both parties sign and on the
155
memo signed by the other party.
Thus, one could argue that circumscribing or abolishing the statute
of frauds as an affirmative defense would constrain the ability of a court to
render just opinions in egregious cases. Carefully applying the fundamental rules of contract formation, however, is a protective substitute. Suppose that after the DBS trader provides the Citibank trader with a dollaryen quote, the Citibank trader says she is "strongly interested" in buying
120 million yen and provides delivery instructions to the DBS trader. On
the value date, DBS delivers 120 million yen to Citibank, but no reciprocal
payment of $1,153,846.15 is made by Citibank. Assume that after the trade
date, the yen depreciated relative to the dollar. Consequently, DBS is anxious to sell its yen at the higher exchange rate that prevailed on the trade
152. This position assumes that the tape recording meets the two basic requirements set
forth in U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1. First, there is "a basis for believing that.., a real transaction"
occurred. Second, the quantity term is set forth.
153. A contract should be enforced, even if the court must resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F.2d 1178, 1185-86 (7th
Cir. 1991) (discussing whether promissory estoppel can be used to avoid limitations on the
enforcement of oral promises placed by the statute of frauds); Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 771 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that promissory estoppel should be

invoked only when it would be inequitable for the court to apply the statute of frauds).
154. Misner, supra note 106, at 943; see also DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d 920,
922, 924 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., plurality and Flaum, J., dissenting respectively); Holley
Equip. Co. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 821 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Campbell v.
Campbell, 371 So.2d 55, 60 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979)); Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d 786, 787 (9th
Cir. 1986).
155. 2 WiutAam D. HAWELAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIFS § 2-201:01, at 9-10

(1992).
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date than at the currently-prevailing rate. 15 6 Therefore, DBS argues that a
dollar-yen contract exists. The statute of frauds allows a court to avoid
enforcing the alleged contract.
Yet, a court need not apply the statute of frauds to achieve this result.
A court can reason that the offer-acceptance process was not completed.
The statement of "interest," even when coupled with the provision of delivery instructions, is not an acceptance of DBS's offer to sell yen. Ostensibly,
such reasoning is a doctrinal sleight-of-hand, that is, using contract formation rules to deal with enforceability problems. Any theoretical distinction
between formation and enforceability, however, is of no practical moment
to the Citibank trader. Whether a court decides that no valid contract
ever was formed or that a contract exists but is unenforceable, the result is
157
the same-Citibank has no obligation to buy 120 million yen.
As the Citibank-DBS example illustrates, the statute of frauds can defeat its own purpose. 158 In effect, the statute of frauds is lop-sided. It is
designed in part to prevent the fraudulent assertion of contractual claims,
yet it allows a party to renege on a deal when an agreed price subsequently
becomes unprofitable because of subsequent market developments. English law reformers have acknowledged this lop-sidedness. As Justice Wilmot's opinion (quoted at the outset of this Part) suggests, English jurists
had complained for many years that the statute promotes fraud. The English Law Reform Committee finally agreed:
"The Act," [the Statute of Frauds] in the words of Lord Campbell
. .. "promotes more fraud than it prevents." True, it shuts out
perjury; but it also and more frequently shuts out the truth. It
strikes unpartially at the perjurer and at the honest man who has
omitted a precaution, sealing the lips of both. Mr. Justice
Fitzjames Stephen . . .went so far as to assert that "in the vast

majority of cases its operation is simply to enable a man to break
a promise with impunity,
because he did not write it down with
159
sufficient formality."
In 1954, almost three centuries after it first enacted the statute of frauds,
60
Parliament repealed the statute.'
156. DBS might cite U.C.C. § 2-204 in its favor, claiming sufficient appropriate conduct
thereunder by Citibank to establish an agreement.
157. The statute of frauds is unnecessary to prevent injustices in other types of cases.
Suppose a wrongdoer claiming she is a Citibank trader telephones a DBS trader and asks for
a dollar-yen quote. The DBS trader provides the quote, and the wrongdoer says "mine, 120
million yen," thereby indicating a purchase of yen for dollars from DBS. The statute of
frauds is a means for a court to ensure that the alleged contract is not enforced against
Citibank. Citibank can argue, however, that under applicable agency law principles the
wrongdoer lacked authority to bind Citibank to an enforceable agreement.
158. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
159. UNITED KINGDOM LAW REVISION COMMrrTE, SixTH INTERiM REPORT, CMD. No. 5449,
9 (1937), quoted in Misner, supra note 106, at 942-43; see also E. ALLAN FANswoRTH, CON-

TRAcrS § 6.1, at 371-72 (1982).
160. FARtswoRTm, supra note 159, at 370-71; see also C. Grunfeld Law Reform (Enforcement
of Contracts) Act, 1954, 17 MOD. L. REv. 451 (1954). For discussions of the history of the
English statute of frauds pertaining to the sale of goods, see Thomson Printing Machinery

Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 714 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1983); Hugh E. Willis, The Statute of FraudsA Legal Anachronism, 3 Ind. LJ.427, 429-32 (1928); George P. Costigan, The Date and Author-
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GLOBAL CURRENCY BAZAAR
Results-Oriented Jurisprudence

Admittedly, rejecting the tangibility paradigm and applying the pragmatic strategy may amount to results-oriented jurisprudence inconsistent
with the aims of the drafters of U.C.C. Article 2. After all, it would be
incorrect to say the drafters intended the statute of frauds to be satisfied
by a tape recording. The official commentary to section 2-201, as well as
related definitional provisions in section 1-201(39) and 1-201(46), indicate that the drafters took a paradigmatic pencil-and-paper approach. 161
This objection, however, must be answered using two fundamental
aims of the drafters. First, the U.C.C. should be interpreted flexibly in
order to promote commercial development. Second, the freedom of parties to contract with one another in a manner they find efficient should
not be abridged. 162 The proposed legislative modifications and judicial
re-interpretations call for Article 2 and the relevant definitions in Article 1
to be changed in the light of technology and culture in the currency bazaar. If legislatures adopt these changes, then the pragmatic justification
for the inclusion of foreign exchange transactions in Article 2 is strengthened. Surely the drafters would prefer to see their sales law "work" for this
market through some modest, constructive tinkering rather than wholly
exempting the market from the law.
Judge Posner-hardly an exponent ofjudicial activism-provided an
illustration of useful tinkering consistent with the drafters' fundamental
aims. In Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corporation,163 he confronted the
issue of whether a memo that precedes the actual formation of a contract
constitutes a writing which satisfies section 2-201. Posner overcame the
perfect tense contained in the statutory language, which says the writing
must be sufficient to show that a contract "has been" made. The plain
meaning is obvious: contract first, writing second. Nevertheless, Posner
held that a pre-contractual writing that indicates acceptance of all the essential terms of an offer satisfies section 2-201 (1).164 Posner reasoned that
a rule of strict temporal priority is unnecessary where one party unilaterally performs its obligations under the alleged contract. The plaintiff who
sought to enforce the contract had conveyed all of its inventory, records,
and other assets to the defendant who invoked the statute of frauds. This
unilateral performance is unthinkable unless a contract exists.
ship of the Statute of Frauds,26 ItAv. L. REv. 329 (1913); Crawford Henning, The OrignalDrafts
of the Statute of Frauds and Their Authors, 61 U. PA. L. REv. 283 (1913); Justice Stephen &
Frederick Pollack, Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds, 1 LAw. Q. REv. 1 (1885).
161. U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 1-201(39), 1-201(46). U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 states:
The required writing need not contain all the material terms of the contract and
such material terms as are stated need not be precisely stated. All that is required is
that the writing afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a
real transaction. It may be written in lead pencil on a scratch pad.
This comment also indicates the drafters' aim to minimize the number of terms a "writing"
must contain. See also Bazak Int'l Corp. v. Mast Industries, Inc., 538 N.Y.S.2d 503, 508 (1989);
1 STATE OF NEw YoR, RePORT OF THE LAw REviSION COMM'N FOR 1954, at 117-18 (1954)
(memorandum by K.N. Llewellyn).
162. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) & cmt. 2; 1 HAwI AND, supra note 155, § 1-102:12 (1984).
163. 931 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1991).
164. Id. at 1182, 1185.
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Posner's flexible approach to the language of section 2-201 is applicable to a tape-recorded spot foreign-exchange trade that lacks any evidentiary writing. The partial performance exception to the statute of frauds,
1 65
set forth in U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(c), reinforces such an approach.
That exception states that a contract that fails to satisfy section 2-201(1)
"but which is valid in other respects is enforceable ...with respect to
goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have
been received and accepted."1 66 Suppose DBS delivers 120 million yen to
Citibank on the value date whereas Citibank fails to deliver $1,153,846.15.
Without a contract, DBS would not deliver the yen, just as the plaintiff in
Monetti would not have turned over its entire business to the defendant
without a pre-existing (albeit oral) contract. Accordingly, a formalistic interpretation of the writing requirement in the statute of frauds would be
unwarranted. The only reasonable inference from the facts is that a contract exists and should be enforced. In sum, Posner-like tinkering isjustifiable in contexts where the facts, and the basic aims of the drafters,
demand enforcement of an oral contract.
C.

Case Two: The Costs and Benefits of Confirmations
1.

The Tangibility Paradigm Again

Case Two is a paradigmatic situation envisioned by section 2-201(2): a
deal made orally, evidenced by a subsequent confirmation slip.' 6 7 Because the confirmations are unsigned or transmitted electronically, they
do not comply with the requirements of U.C.C. section 2-201 (1). However, the merchant's exception of section 2-201(2) provides that:
[b]etween merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents,
it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party
unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within
10 days after it is received. 168
Strictly speaking, this provision is not an "exception" to the statute of
frauds but rather "an alternate method of satisfying the writing require169
ment" of section 2-201(1) that is available for merchants.
165.
166.

Curiously, Posner does not discuss this exception in detail in the Monetti opinion.
U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (c). A three-pronged definition of "acceptance" is set forth in

U.C.C. § 2-606.
167. Monetti, 931 F.2d 1178; see also Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's Inc., 761 F.2d

1117 (5th Cir. 1985) (involving an oral offer to sell followed by a written invoice). The nonparadigmatic situation is the reverse: a writing is prepared before the actual formation of the
contract. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
168. U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
169. Migerobe, Inc. v. Certina USA, Inc., 924 F.2d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, some commentators provide a misleading explanation of U.C.C. § 2-201(2). See, e.g.,
Scarborough, supra note 108, at 20.
A "merchant" is defined in U.C.C. § 2-104(1) as:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in
the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employ-
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Accordingly, one way of satisfying the statute of frauds is to require a
written confirmation between parties like Citibank and DBS. 170 Case Two,
then, involves the exchange of written confirmations between dealing
banks after the banks' traders conclude their recorded telephonic communication. The confirmations identify the currencies involved, the
buyer and seller of the currencies, the exchange rate between the currencies, the amount of currencies to be delivered, and the value date. A costbenefit analysis of the exchange of confirmations pursuant to the statute
of frauds indicates that requiring this exchange does not serve the needs
of the market.
Llewellyn envisioned parties like Citibank and DBS making contracts
by telephone:
These days we are making contracts over the long-distance
telephone as an increasingly standard practice. Decent businessmen having made a contract over the long-distance telephone
confirm before five o'clock or close of business that day. As the
statute now stands, any crook who wishes to play it both ways
against the middle has only to fail to communicate [i.e., to answer the counterparty] and the other guy is stuck. He can hold
him or get out according to the market.
This happy opportunity for fraud is unfortunately being indulged in to a considerable extent.
We think that the machinery provided in the section [section 2-201(2)], not by any means wholly satisfactory, at least is a
safeguard against this particular type of abuse and fits the
prac71
tice of constantly closing deals at a distance, and orally.'
ment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
Surely, Citibank and DBS are merchants because they deal in currency, satisfy the
"knowledge or skill" test, or meet the attribution test.
There is no bright-line test for what constitutes a "reasonable time." It "depends on the
nature, purpose and circumstances" of the action that is required. U.C.C. § 1-204(2). Because of the short-term volatility of exchange rates, a "reasonable time" may be a shorter
period in the context of the currency bazaar than in other markets. See, e.g., Lish v.
Compton, 547 P.2d 223, 227 (Utah 1976) (holding that twelve days was not a "reasonable
time" with respect to the wheat market in which prices fluctuated rapidly).
The correct approach to U.C.C. § 2-201(2) appears to be that it is an exception to the
signature requirement, not the writing requirement. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) states that a writing
must be "sufficient against the sender." This phrase implies that while a written confirmation
is required, the signature of the recipient on the confirmation is not needed. To enforce a
contract, the sender of a confirmation must produce that confirmation and must have signed
it; but the sender need not also show that the recipient signed the confirmation. In other
words, to deprive the confirmation recipient of the statute of frauds defense, the confirmation need only be signed by the sender and indicate the existence of a contract. If the recipient receives the confirmation and does not make a timely objection to it, the recipient loses
the statute of frauds defense. Therefore, U.C.C. § 2-201(2) excuses the need for the recipient of a confirmation to sign the confirmation.
170. See, e.g., Lambert Corp. v. Evans, 575 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that written
confirmation of an oral telephone contract satisfied § 2-201). See generally FARNSWORTH, supra
note 159, § 6.7, at 405 (1982) (stating that "the usual way to satisfy the statute [of frauds] is
still by a signed writing, commonly called a 'memorandum' ").
171. 1 STATE OF NEw Yoa, REPORT OF THE LAw RmSION COMM'N FOR 1954 179.
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But, like Misner, Llewellyn could not overcome the tangibility paradigm.
In fact, Llewellyn successfully advocated the adoption of section 2-201(2).
Yet, contrary to Llewellyn's view, there is nothing indecent about concluding a deal by telephone without exchanging written confirmations.
Llewellyn and Misner are not alone in defending the tangibility paradigm. The leading advocate of the use of written confirmations, as well as
the exclusion of foreign exchange transactions from U.C.C. Article 2, is
the Federal Reserve. Acting through the Foreign Exchange Committee
("FEC")-an informal advisory group of roughly thirty U.S. and foreign
commercial and investment banks and foreign exchange brokers-the
Federal Reserve repeatedly encourages market participants to exchange
written confirmations. 172 The FEC "believes that the practice of confirming trades by personnel other than traders is the best protection against
misdirected trades, payments problems, and other potentially costly mis173
takes as well as a deterrent to unauthorized dealing."
In spite of the doubt cast below on written confirmations, the FEC
continues to advocate the exchange of confirmations.1 74 A possible explanation for this intransigence is the regulatory influence of the Federal Reserve on the FEC. The Federal Reserve is responsible for supervising many
of the commercial banks (and their holding companies) that participate
172. See, e.g., FEC 1992, supra note 14, at 9; FoREIGN EXCHANGE COMMIrrEE, 1990 ANNUAL
REPORT 5 (1991) [hereinafter FEC 1990]; FOREIGN EXCHANGE COMMITTEE, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1990) [hereinafter FEC 1989].
173. FEC 1990, supra note 172, at 5. Accordingly, the IFEMA, which was drafted by the
Financial Market Lawyers Group of the FEC, states that foreign exchange transactions governed by the IFEMA "shall be promptly confirmed by the Parties by Confirmations exchanged by mail, telex, facsimile or other electronic means." IFEMA, supra note 14, § 2.3.
Section 8.15 of the IFEMA, allows parties to agree on a specific timing for the exchange,
checking, and challenge of confirmations. Absent manifest error, confirmations are deemed
correct three business days after receipt by a party. An example of manifest error would be
where there is a conflict between the confirmation and a tape recording of the conversation
between traders. See IFEMA GUIDE, supra note 14, § III.C, at 7. Under § 8.3 of the IFEMA, a
tape recording is the preferred evidence of the terms of a transaction. The definition of
"Confirmation" in § I of the IFEMA lists the elements that should be included in the document. But, no sample confirmation form is appended to the IFEMA because no single format is accepted in the foreign exchange market as a standard. IFEMA GUIDE, supra note 14,
§ III.C, at 8. Breach of the obligation to send a confirmation, however, carries no penalty;
failure to exchange confirmations "shall not prejudice or invalidate" any foreign exchange
transaction. Id.
174. See infra notes 176-216 and accompanying text. As the FEC recently reaffirmed:
Nevertheless, the [Foreign Exchange] Committee felt strongly that uritten confirmations were still necessary and that tapes did not provide a sufficiently secure and
continuous alternative record .... [I]n [a] ... letter to foreign exchange market
participants responding to the CIB proposal ..., the Committee emphasized that it
is as necessary as ever to have timely, written confirmations for all spot deals with
banks and other dealers.
FEC 1990 supra note 172, at 5-6.
The only modification to this position concerns the means of transmitting confirmations. The Federal Reserve now acknowledges that transmitting confirmations in a timely
manner, namely, electronically, by telex, or fax, is preferable to sending them in the mail.
FEC 1990, supra note 172, at 6, 29; see also FEC 1992, supra note 14, at 9. Electronic transmission occurs through one of two linkages among trading banks: the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) system or a direct-dealing system. While
such transmissions would entail a transaction cost, at least they would be available before the
value date of a spot transaction.
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in the foreign exchange market. 175 The Federal Reserve may suspect that
the foreign exchange market is plagued by questionable and possibly illegal trading practices that threaten the safety and soundness of the participants it supervises. Written confirmations provide the Federal Reserve
with an "audit trail," that is, potential evidence of improper practices. Determined wrongdoers, however, will not hesitate to falsify records. Hence,
the practical value of written confirmations for Federal regulators and law
enforcement agencies is limited. Tape recordings of traders' and brokers'
conversations are themselves audit trails.
2.

Delays and Costs

Exchanging confirmations is by no means a universal practice in the
foreign exchange market. Many market participants find it time-consuming and costly. Traders seek to conclude their transactions quickly. It is
infeasible to require traders to spend much time confirming their trades.
After concluding one deal over the phone, their attention turns immediately to the next deal. Not surprisingly, the task of confirming-if it is
performed-is left to the trading bank's operations department. The
main point, however, is that the merchants exception provides little help
to traders. In effect, the statute of frauds "interfere[s] with expeditious
contracting by delaying mutual obligation from legally attaching until
176
some later time."
In addition to these delays, exchanging confirmations entails preparatory, transmission, and storage costs. Preparatory costs are those connected with the preparation of the confirmation. The officials in the
operations department of Citibank and DBS must ascertain the terms of
the trade (e.g., the currencies involved, exchange rates, value date, and
delivery instructions) by listening to the tape recorded conversations of
the traders, talking with the traders, and checking any written records like
trade tickets. The officials must be paid for their time and effort. Sending
the prepared confirmation via mail, telex, or fax entails a transmission
cost. While this cost may be small for a single confirmation, the fact that
Citibank and DBS enter into hundreds of deals every day means that the
cumulative transmission cost could be significant. Finally, cautious market
participants may seek to store confirmations for the statute of limitations
period. Under U.C.C. section 2-725(1), the statute of limitations for an
action involving a contract for sale is four years from the date the claim
accrues. Either the writings must be stored in a warehouse, leading to
inventory and property costs, or converted to microfiche, resulting in storage costs. The sum of preparatory, transmission, and storage costs is a
177
sizeable transaction cost connected with every foreign exchange trade.
175. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Reserve has supervisory authority over all bank holding companies. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1988). It is also responsible for su-

pervising commercial banks that are state-chartered and members of the Federal Reserve
System. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (1988) (defining "appropriate Federal banking agency").
176. Misner, supra note 106, at 945.
177. As the FEC admits:
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Curiously, in Monetti, Judge Posner observed that one purpose of the
statute of frauds is "to make the contractual process cheaper and more
certain by encouraging the parties to contracts to memorialize their agreement."1 78 Posner, however, failed to elaborate on this purpose. It could
be that compliance with the statute of frauds leads to less litigation and,
thus, greater certainty and lower legal costs. 179 Here, the statute of frauds
acts in tandem with the parol evidence rule set forth in U.C.C. section 2202. By forcing parties to reduce their deal to a writing, the terms thereof
will be recorded. Parties will not have to rely on their memories or notes
to check the terms. Because such sources are potentially inconsistent, reliance thereon could generate uncertainty. Thus, prudent parties might
not only reduce their agreement to writing, but also include a merger
1 80
clause to ensure their agreement is integrated.
If this logic is what Posner had in mind, then it seems to be undermined by the statute of frauds itself. As discussed below, exactly what a
document must contain to be a "writing" and to satisfy section 2-201 (1) is
unclear.1 81 Accordingly, if disputes about the terms of the transaction
arise, then surely the parties will rely on the tape recorded conversations
of their transaction for guidance.1 82 Yet, if the tape is the key evidentiary
means for resolving disputed trades, then why bother with a writing in the
first place?

Some banks operate on the assumption that confirmation for a spot trade by a
recorded telephone conversation is adequate as long as the contracts settle; they
retain written confirmations only for use in the case of a disputed or failed trade.
These banks have adopted this procedure in order to reduce office costs. They are
willing to accept the risk that their more informal confirmation procedures may
expose them to a larger number of misdirected spot trades.
FEC 1989, supra note 172, at 9 (emphasis added). The FEC's view that reliance on tape
recordings exposes banks to greater risk is questioned below.
178. Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F.2d at 1181.
179. See, e.g., DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d at 925 (Flaum, J., dissenting). Indeed, in Monetti Posner cites Professor Farnsworth's treatise in support of the proposition
that the statute of frauds "is largely based on distrust of the ability ofjuries to determine the
truth of testimony that there was or was not a contract." Monetti, 931 F.2d at 1181 (citing
FARNSwoRTH, supra note 159, § 6.1, at 85 (1990)). The inference that Posner draws from this
proposition is that it is more costly, and the outcome less certain, to leave this determination
to a jury than to memorialize an agreement in writing. An alternative-and not necessarily
inconsistent-inference is that ajury is less competent than the parties (or ajudge) to make
the determination.
180. This clause (also called an integration clause) is designed to prevent inconsistent
sources from undermining the integrity of the agreement because of the parol evidence rule.
See generally 2 FARmNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 7.3.
181. See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
182. Disputes about representations and warranties are unlikely because the participants
are likely to be well-known to each other and to have dealt with each other on several previous occasions. A dispute could arise about the designated account to which the yen are to be
delivered. Reference to the tape-recorded conversation of the traders might be fruitless in
resolving this dispute. Officials of the operations departments of Citibank and DBS, and not
the banks' traders, would be responsible for exchanging delivery instructions. Referral to
their oral or written communications would be necessary.
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3.

Practical Irrelevance

There are very few benefits to requiring the exchange of written confirmations that offset the aforementioned delays. The FEC argues that
183
"[c]onfirmations are an important defense against error and fraud."
84
The comments above regarding fraud promotion rebut this argument.
Moreover, the alleged benefit assumes that confirmations are, in fact, exchanged promptly. Suppose Citibank sends a written confirmation to DBS
on November 1. DBS, which has reason to know of the contents of the
confirmation, fails to respond to the confirmation by November 10. The
confirmation would satisfy the writing requirement of section 2-201(1).185

By failing to answer Citibank's written confirmation, DBS loses the defense
of the statute of frauds, but Citibank must still prove that an oral contract
18 6
was made prior to the written confirmation.
As a practical matter, however, this result would be irrelevant. The
value date of the spot transaction is November 3, and therefore, the dollar
and yen legs should settle on that date. Thus, while confirmations exchanged by mail among foreign exchange market participants satisfy section 2-201(2), they rarely, if ever, arrive in time to identify problems
before the value date of a spot transaction.' 87 Not surprisingly, in 1989
the U.S. Council on International Banking ("CIB") recommended that
banks discontinue the exchange of confirmations by mail because the
88
practice serves no practical purpose.'
The only way to detect an error before November 3 would be to check
the tape recording of the traders' oral agreement or to exchange confirmations electronically, by telex, or by fax on November 1 or 2. Again,
written confirmations transmitted by these swift means are unnecessary
where tape recordings of that transaction exist. The CIB's recommendation correctly pointed out that taped telephone conversations are a more
efficient method of detecting problems with a trade. 189 They are immediately available for use by the operations departments.
4.

Helping the Sophisticated

Given the trusting nature of currency bazaar participants, it is not surprising that many foreign exchange traders find written confirmations unnecessary. After all, repeat players are unlikely to attempt to defraud one
another for fear of being ostracized from the marketplace. Citibank's attempt to renege on its agreement with DBS jeopardizes Citibank's own
standing in the market. The foreign exchange market has been characterized (in gender-biased terms) as a "gentleman's market" where "a trader's
183.
184.
185.
(1) and
(1989).

DEW GuIDE, supra note 14, § III.C, at 7.
See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
The same writing standard set forth in U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt 1 applies to sub-sections
(2) of§ 2-201. See, e.g., Bazak Int'l Corp. v. Mast Indus. Inc., 538 N.Y.S.2d 503, 508

186. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 3.
187. FEC 1990, supra note 172, at 5.

188. Id
189. Id.
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word is his bond." When the DBS trader responds "120 million yen, yours,
at 104," a deal is struck. To renege is to lose credibility.
Overall, market participants police themselves by refusing to deal with
those who cannot be trusted to fulfill obligations to which they have committed verbally. Because the market has been generally free from the maladies of fraud and deceit, this self-regulating mechanism has worked.
Rigid adherence to section 2-201(2) is, therefore, unnecessary.
This point leads to a reconsideration of one of the purposes of the
statute of frauds, namely, precluding the enforceability of contractual
claims where a party does not knowingly assume a contractual obligation. 190 The hidden presumption is that parties are unsophisticated and
need protection from wandering unwittingly into a legally enforceable obligation. Yet, foreign exchange market participants hardly need such protection. They are large commercial and investment banks, corporations,
and investment funds. Not surprisingly, they are acutely aware not only of
the risks of trading in the currency bazaar, but also of how trades are negotiated, executed, and consummated.
5.

The Tension with the Parol Evidence Rule

Written confirmations are not only irrelevant in practice and unnecessary for the sophisticated market participants of the currency bazaar, but
they are also potentially dangerous. Insofar as the contractual terms in
them are inconsistent with those stated in the tape recorded telephone
conversations, they may generate problems of parol evidence. Suppose
the dollar-yen transaction between Citibank and DBS is a thirty-day forward purchase of yen entered into on November 1, i.e., the value date is
November 30.191 The operations department official of Citibank records
the terms of the transaction; however, instead of indicating that 120 million yen are purchased, she records that yen are sold. This confirmation is
sent to DBS within a reasonable time, and DBS does not send an objection
to the confirmation within ten days after it is received. Pursuant to U.C.C.
section 2-201 (2), the formal requirements of section 2-201 (1) are met.
While enforceability is not an issue, what exactly should be enforced
is in doubt. On the value date, Citibank demands $1,153,846.15 from
DBS, which replies that Citibank is entitled to 120 million yen. Plainly,
Citibank's written confirmation is incorrect. It is certain to be inconsistent
with the tape recording of the conversation between the Citibank and DBS
traders. It also may be inconsistent with Citibank's deal ticket. To ascertain whether Citibank bought, instead of sold, yen, the operations department officials of the two banks must speak with each other, examine their
deal tickets, and check the confirmations against the tape recordings and
deal tickets.
The point is that the greater the number of sources which evidence
the agreement, the greater the probability of inconsistencies in the
190. See, e.g., Scarborough, supra note 108, at 22.
191. For a discussion of forward transactions, see supra note 17.

1994]

GLOBAL CURRWNCY BAZAAR

sources. Requiring more confirmations of a trade is not necessarily a safeguard against error. To the contrary, it can foster errors, thus exacerbating risk and confusion in the currency bazaar.1 9 Had the parties relied
on the tape recordings, the mess may have been averted. This scenario is
hardly far-fetched. Indeed, its facts resemble those in Intershoe, Inc. v.
Bankers Trust Co. 19 3 Moreover, as one foreign exchange market observer
stated, "[t]here cannot be any market dealer anywhere who has never
done a deal 'the wrong way round', or for the wrong amount, or the
19 4
wrong value date, or some other major error at some time."
In this Citibank-DBS dispute, the parol evidence rule of section 2-202
must be applied to determine the terms of the transaction. 1 9 5 This application yields two principal difficulties. First, the methodology used when
applying this rule is uncertain. Second, the rule can produce erroneous
results.
With respect to methodology, the Court must decide whether Citibank's written confirmation is the final expression of the parties with
respect to the terms of their agreement. Then, the court must decide
whether the confirmation constitutes an integrated agreement. Assuming
the writing itself does not indicate that it is or is not the complete, conclusive statement of the terms, the Court must make this determination. To
be sure, the standard the Court must apply under Article 2 is clearer than
192. It can also foster disputes about whether the contents of a document are adequate to
allow a court to conclude that the document constitutes a writing for purposes of the statute
of frauds. See, e.g.,
Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d 786, 790 (9th Cir' 1986) (concerning whether a
written memorandum contained enough of the essential terms, with sufficient specificity, to
evidence a contract).
193. In Intershoe, 569 N.Y.S.2d 333 (N.Y. 1991), a shoe importer, Intershoe, entered into
thirty-week dollar-Italian lira forward transactions with Bankers Trust. (The court erroneously referred to these transactions as "futures." Because they took place in the over-thecounter market and not on an organized exchange, they are forwards. See Bhala supra note 2,
at 100). Bankers Trust sent Intershoe a confirmation indicating that it had bought
537,750,000 lira from, and sold $250,000 to, Intershoe. Intershoe signed the confirmation
and returned it to Bankers Trust. Just before the delivery date, Intershoe said that it had
bought, not sold, lira. Intershoe's attempt to introduce a supporting affidavit was rebuffed by
virtue of Section 2-202. The court found the confirmation to be the final expression of the
parties' agreement. Intershoe, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
Curiously, while the disputed transactions were negotiated and concluded by telephone,
the court did not refer to the tape recordings of the parties' conversations. Moreover, the
court's dicta that "a confirmation slip or similar writing is usually the only reliable evidence
of such transactions," id.at 336-37, is factually erroneous.
194. JoHN HEYwooD, FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE COP'O.AT TREASURER 109 (2d ed.
1979).
195. U.C.C. § 2-202 states:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradictedby evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement
but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade ...or by course of performance; and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement.
(emphasis added).
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under the common law.196 Official comment 3 to section 2-202 states that
extrinsic evidence of contractual terms must be excluded "[i]f the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been
1 97
included in the document.
Unfortunately, the U.C.C. Article 2 standard may be non-sensical and
lead to uncertain results in a dispute such as that between Citibank-DBS
where one party has confused the deal. Surely if Citibank had agreed to
sell yen, then it would have stated so in the confirmation; consequently,
tape recordings must be excluded from consideration. Yet, in fact, selling
yen is exactly what Citibank agreed to do, as the tape recordings can
prove. Citibank did not state it sold yen because of a clerk's innocent
error in making the confirmation, the dishonesty of a trader in writing a
deal ticket, or some other reason. Thus, on the one hand, a court might
hold the Citibank confirmation is not an integration and, therefore, extrinsic evidence such as the tape recording should be admitted. 19 8 But, on
the other hand, following a strict construction of the test in official comment 3, a court could come to the opposite conclusion. In sum, because
application of the parol evidence rule may yield inconsistent results in similar cases, the important goal of providing certainty and predictability to
foreign exchange market participants is lost. 199
196. One common law test, proposed by Professor Williston, focuses on whether reasonable parties, situated as were the parties to this contract, would have naturally and normally
included the extrinsic matter in the writing. 4 SAMUEL WILISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS §§ 638-39 (3d ed. 1961). Williston's test leads to the result that merger clauses
usually are conclusive evidence of the completeness of a writing.
Professor Corbin advocated a two-step inquiry, not an objective "reasonable person" test.
The judge should consider extrinsic materials to determine whether there is "respectable"
evidence that an antecedent agreement was made. If so, then the judge should determine
whether the antecedent agreement was discharged by the subsequent writing. 3 ARTHUR L.
CoRBIN, CORaIN ON

CoNRApcrs § 582

(1960);

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRAcrs

§§ 210(3), 214 (1981). Under Corbin's test, a merger clause is only one item of evidence
weighed against other facts.
Yet another test, found in Sections 229 and 230 of the RESTATEMENT (FrsT) OF CON-

TRACTS (1932), asks whether reasonable persons in the parties' situation would have included
the disputed provision in the contract.
Not surprisingly, Professor Murray, while discerning a movement toward the Corbin test,
concluded that the case law "has been generally ineffective in articulating a workable rationale ... " JOHN E. MubRAY, MURAY ON CoNrAcrs § 107, at 235-36 (2d rev. ed. 1974) (footnote omitted).
197. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (emphasis added). This comment is commended as a "consistent starting point" that improves on the common law. See, e.g., Manire, supra note 7, at 1204.
U.C.C. § 2-202 manifests Llewellyn's approach to the problem of deciding whether a writing
is integrated.

198. One ground for this conclusion could be that Citibank's confirmation is "merely to
furnish an aid to the writer's recollection." 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAS AT COM.

MON LAW § 2429, at 96 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). A different ground could be that the confirmation is designed solely to satisfy the statute of frauds under U.C.C. § 2-201(2). Some cases
have adopted this approach. See, e.g., Southern States Dev. Co. v. Robinson, 494 S.W.2d 777,
782 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that if a memorandum meets the Statute of Frauds, the
entire contract may be explained and proved by parol evidence); Nathan v. Spector, 120
N.Y.S.2d 358, (N.Y. App. Div. 1953) (holding that parol evidence may even be used to determine whether a memorandum meets the Statute of Frauds).
199. An interesting question is whether reformation of the terms stated in the confirmation is possible based on the tape recordings.
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Strangely, neither the Intershoe nor IBJ courts applied the "would certainly" standard. In addition, neither court explained why it rejected this
standard.2 0 0 Both courts were inevitably dragged into fact-specific inquiries, but each court emphasized different facts. The Intershoecourt focused
on the terms stated in the confirmation itself.20 1 In effect, it applied the
four-corners test, looking only at the writing to decide its completeness.
The IBJ court examined all the evidence of completeness and exclusivity,
including evidence beyond the writing. It considered the intention of the
relationship, and the omisparties, the history of their negotiations and
20 2
sion of a signature from the confirmations.
Not only did each court highlight different facts, but they also rendered diametrically opposed judgments. In Intershoe the parol evidence
rule barred out extrinsic evidence, while in IBJ such evidence was admitted. Consequently, these cases have created considerable uncertainty in
the currency bazaar. Participants cannot predict exactly how a court
might analyze whether a confirmation is an integrated agreement or the
likely result. Suppose the Court determines that Citibank's written confirmation is an integration of the agreement. The second difficulty resulting
from the application of section 2-202 is that it leads to an erroneous result.
The tape recording cannot be introduced as evidence because it contradicts the confirmation. The result is that incorrect contractual terms are
enforced, namely, that Citibank delivers rather than receives yen. DBS was
in the best position to correct the confirmation but failed to do so. This
factor, however, should not be dispositive.
200. One possibility arises from a close reading of U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3, which refers to
subsection (b). The comment indicates that the court should focus on whether the parties
intended the writing to be a complete and conclusive statement of all the terms. If the parties so intended, then evidence of consistent additional terms must be kept from the trier of
fact.
201. 569 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336. The facts of the case are discussed supra note 193.
202. IB, supra note 45, at 422-23. In IBJ, a Chilean company, Compania Sud-Americana
de Vapores (CSAV) received foreign currencies in payment for its shipping services. The
currencies were deposited in an account maintained by IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust ("Schroder"), which was responsible for converting the currencies into U.S. dollars and crediting
CSAV's account with Schroder. Schroder confirmed each currency conversion transaction
with CSAV. The gravamen of CSAV's complaint was that Schroder charged exchange rates
that were in excess of spot market rates. Id. at 415-16.
These facts are distinguishable from those in Intershoe in certain key respects. Intershoe
involved a written confirmation of a single transaction. The confirmation was an integrated
document that reflected the terms to which the parties had agreed over the telephone. Consequently, the parol evidence rule barred the admission of extrinsic evidence to supplement

or alter the terms of the transaction. Intershoe, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 337. IBJ involved a large
number of currency conversions, and CSAV did not telephone Schroder to negotiate and
conclude these transactions. Rather, the currency conversions were performed by Schroder
pursuant to a prior overarching management agreement made with CSAV. The confirmations of each conversion were not intended to reflect this agreement. Hence, the parol evidence rule could not bar extrinsic evidence about its terms. IBJ, supra note 45, at 432.
The fact that Intershoe involved one confirmation whereas IBJ involved several is irrelevant for purposes of applying the parol evidence rule. A final expression of an agreement
may be manifested in one or more documents. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 2-10, at
98. Accordingly, the decision in B.N.E., Swedbank, S.A. v. Banker, 794 F. Supp. 1291,
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 996 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1993), is suspect. The B.N.E. court stated that
Intershoe was irrelevant because it involved a single document whereas the case at hand involved several confirmation slips. Id. at 1292.
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The effect of the parol evidence rule is "to give preference to the
written version of [the] terms [of a contract]." 20 3 The justification for this
preference is that "[w]ritings are more reliable than memories to show
contract terms, and forgery is supposedly easier to detect than is lying on
the witness stand."20 4 Many critics of the rule emphasize that it is inconsistent with conventional processes of proof-juries should be allowed to
hear all relevant evidence. 20 5 The criticism is even more poignant in the
context of the currency bazaar where the conversation between the contracting parties is tape recorded. Obviously, a tape recording is the most
reliable evidence of the transaction terms. The parol evidence rule compels a court to behave like an ostrich with its head in the sand. Application of the rule may specifically exclude the one form of evidence that can
conclusively resolve whether Citibank bought or sold yen.
In sum, there is a tension between section 2-201(2) and the parol
evidence rule. The former can be satisfied with a written confirmation to
which there is no objection. The confirmation, however, generates a potential problem under section 2-202. It may transform the most reliable
evidence of the transaction, the tape recording, into parol evidence.
Therefore, the use of tapes to resolve disputes about terms becomes
uncertain.
6.

The Tension with the Battle of the Forms Rule

A similar tension exists between U.C.C. section 2-201(2) and Article
2's provision on the battle of the forms, section 2-207. Suppose both Citibank and DBS issue and exchange written confirmations on the trade
date, November 1, after they reach an oral agreement evidenced by a tape
recording. 20 6 These confirmations, printed on each bank's standard
form, conflict. Citibank's confirmation says that it bought 120 million yen
for value on November 30, whereas DBS's confirmation says that the value
date is November 3. DBS does not notify Citibank of any objection to the
terms of Citibank's confirmation, but on November 3 it sends 120 million
yen to Citibank and asks Citibank for the reciprocal delivery of
$1,153,846.15. Citibank objects, saying the deal involved the forward, not
spot, sale of yen.

20 7

203. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 2-9, at 95.

204. Id.
205. Id. at 95 & n.3.
206. The above hypothetical is a combination of Cases (1) and (6) in WHIrr & SUMMERS,
supra note 53, § 1-3, at 30-36, 43-46. See also Douglas G. Baird & George Weisberg, Rules,
Standards, and the Battle of the Forms; A Reassesment of Section 2-207, 68 VA. L. Rav. 1217-19
(1982) (discussing the scenarios to which the battle of the forms refers). For a recent survey
of proposed revisions to U.C.C. § 2-207, see Ending the "Battle of the Forms": A Symposium on the
Revson of Sedion 2-207 of the Uniform Commerial Code, 49 Bus. LAw. 1019 (1994). Except for
the additional fact regarding the tape recording, the hypothetical is one of the two paradigmatic cases that U.C.C. § 2-207 is designed to deal with: "the written confirmation [situation], where an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal correspondence
between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties sending formal memoranda
embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms not discussed." U.C.C. § 2-207
cmt. 1.
207. See supra note 17 regarding forward transactions.
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Here the problem is the battle of the forms and application of section
2-207. Assuming the confirmations do not constitute an integrated agreement, if the terms of the Citibank and DBS confirmations conflict or if
one confirmation omits a term that the other includes, then a court must
determine which terms are part of the contract. 20 Applying section 2-207
and
again highlights the importance of the tape recorded conversation
20 9
the disruption caused by the very use of written confirmations.
Because the confirmations state different delivery dates, the threshold
question is whether section 2-207(2) covers different as well as additional
contractual terms.2 10 The answer is uncertain. Even though U.C.C. section 2-207(1) expressly refers to "different" terms, section 2-207(2) does
not contain this language. "[T]he drafters could easily have inserted 'or
different' if they had so intended." 211 Official comment 3 to U.C.C. section 2-207 and some case law, however, do indicate that different terms are
covered.212

Assuming section 2-207(2) governs, its application is problematic.
One interpretation is that the language "additional term" means "additional or different terms." Interpreted this way, U.C.C. sections 2207(2) (b) and (c) indicate that an additional term automatically becomes
part of the contract unless (i) that term "materially alter[s]" the contract
or (ii) the recipient of the confirmation with the additional term objects
to it within a "reasonable time" after receiving the confirmation. Because
DBS failed to answer Citibank's confirmation "within a reasonable time
after additional terms were proposed, it is both fair and commercially
208. Note that U.C.C. § 2-202 automatically construes the writings as integrated to the
extent that they agree on certain terms. See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron
& Metal,lnc., 600 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1979). Note also that U.C.C. § 2-207 has received considerable scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Charles M. Thatcher, Battle ofthe Forms: Solution by Revision
of Section 2-207, 6 UCC L.J. 237, 240 (1984) (arguing that § 2-207 has "discouraged the expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties" and
yielded "unsettled case law and consequent lack of uniformity.... ."); W. David Slawson, The
New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 21, 59 (1984) (arguing that offer and acceptance forms can be drafted to prevent the
making of a contract, with the result that the common law mirror-image rule is reinstated);
Baird & Weisberg, supra note 206 (arguing that § 2-207 is so vague that it leaves a number or
questions unresolved).
209. According to the common law mirror image rule, one confirmation (presumably the
first one sent) would be treated as an offer, while the other confirmation would be an effective acceptance only if it did not vary the terms of the offer. I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRAirs §§ 58-60 (1979); see also WHIrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 1-3, at 29-30. Because such a variation exists in the Citibank-DBS case, one of the confirmations would be
treated as a counter-offer. To decide the terms of the contract, the Court would examine
evidence of a prior oral agreement, including the tape recordings.
210. This section may be particularly relevant to the dispute because Citibank and DBS
are "merchants." See supra note 169.
211. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 1-3, at 32 (footnote omitted).
212. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) operates automatically to convert a confirmation with different
terms as a proposal for an addition to the contract. Official comment 3 indicates that
"[w]hether or not additional or different terms will become part of the agreement depends on
the provisions of subsection (2)." U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (emphasis added); see also Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Nielsons, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 896, 900 (D. Colo. 1986); Steiner v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 569 P.2d 751 (Cal. 1977) (holding that § 2-207(2) applies to different and additional terms). But see WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, § 1-3, at 32 nn.11-12.
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sound to assume that their inclusion has been assented to."2 13 The transaction, regardless of what the Citibank and DBS traders agreed to on tape,
becomes a yen forward unless DBS persuades a court that the November
30 delivery date is a material alteration of the contract. Thus, the Citibank-DBS dispute becomes one of materiality of the delivery term.
This result is unsatisfactory. "Materiality" is a fact-specific determination that may involve protracted litigation.2 1 4 While official comment 4 to
U.C.C. section 2-207 provides limited guidance on what constitutes a "material alteration," the statute itself is silent on the matter. Thus, there is no
guarantee of consistent results in other like cases.
An alternative and preferable approach to the application of section
2-207(2) is to focus on the advice provided in official comment 6:
Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict
each party must be assumed to object to a clause of the other conflicting with one on the confirmation sent by himself. As a result
the requirement that there be notice of objection which is found
in subsection (2) is satisfied and the conflicting terms do not become part of the contract. The contract then consists of the terms
originally expressly agreed to, terms on which the confirmations
agree, and terms supplied by this Act, including subsection (2).
The written confirmation is also subject to Section 2-201. Under
that section a failure to respond permits enforcement of a prior
oral agreement; under this section a failure to respond permits
215
additional terms to become part of the agreement.
Plainly, the conflicting terms stated in the confirmation are not part of the
contract (though this may not be the case under the proposed revisions to
Article 2). Rather, a court relies on the tape recordings of the agreement
as evidence of the value date that was originally agreed to by the Citibank
and DBS foreign exchange traders.
In sum, under the latter approach to its application, section 2-207(2)
may be equipped to handle the problem of inconsistent confirmations.
Yet, this resolution begs the question of the repercussions of using such
confirmations. There is a tension between the statute of frauds (specifically, section 2-201 (2)) and section 2-207 (2) in the context of the currency
bazaar: satisfying the former with written confirmations lays the foundation for battle of the forms problems. Such problems are best avoided by
eliminating confirmations and relying on the tape recording for dispositive evidence of the terms of the dollar-yen transaction.
D.

Linking the Resolutions of the Scope and Enforceability Problems

The pragmatic strategy links the resolution of the enforceability and
scope problems. Whether the definition of "goods" in U.C.C. section 2105(1) ought to encompass foreign exchange should depend in part on
213. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6.
214. See, e.g., Luedtke Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598, 600 (7th
Cir. 1984); St. Charles Cable TV, Inc. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 820, 827
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
215. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6 (emphasis added).
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whether the application of the statute of frauds serves the needs of foreign
exchange market participants. As presently constituted and interpreted, it
does not. The statute of frauds would render unenforceable many foreign
exchange transactions that should be enforced. The statute may lead to
problems of parol evidence and the battle of the forms. Therefore, Llewellyn's argument that "after two centuries and a half the statute stands, in
essence better adapted to our needs than when it was first passed"2 16 is
unpersuasive. At least in the context of the foreign exchange market, the
statute of frauds in U.C.C. Article 2 must be reformed or abolished
through legislative or judicial action.
Does this argument necessarily dictate that foreign exchange should
not be considered a "good"? The argument strongly suggests an affirmative answer. Such an answer, however, would be an overreaction. Thus,
the Court should reject DBS's response to Citibank's statute of frauds defense. A final resolution of the scope problem depends on more than the
outcome of the enforceability problem. A complete assessment of other
significant Article 2 provisions in relation to the needs of the currency
2 17
bazaar is needed.
V.

EXTENDING THE PRAGMATIC STRATEGY TO OTHER SALEs LAw

Parts III and IV considered the potential applicability of the U.C.C. to
the Citibank-DBS dispute chronicled in Part II. This assumption is now
relaxed. The application of three other sales laws to the scope and enforceability problems is considered below: revised U.C.C. Article 2, the
CISG, and private sales law. Part V argues that the pragmatic strategy can
be extended to deal with these problems under other sales law regimes.
A.

Current Proposals to Revise U.C.C. Article 2

One proposed revision would decisively resolve the scope problem by
excluding all foreign exchange transactions from U.C.C. Article 2. Section 2-102(a) (23) of the December 1993 and August 1994 Drafts of revised
Article 2 defines "goods" as "all things ...that are movable... [h]owever,
the term does not include . . .foreign exchange transactions."2 18 Unfortunately, the Reporter's Notes do not indicate why foreign exchange transactions are expressly excluded. There is no siggestion that the exclusion
reflects a calculated decision that the provisions of revised Article 2 would
be inapposite to the currency bazaar, though this indeed may be the case.
Interestingly, the December 1993 and August 1994 Drafts also abolish
the statute of frauds, thus resolving the enforceability problem. Section 2201 states that "[a] contract ...is enforceable whether or not there is a
216.

Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 747

(1931).
217. Such provisions include those relating to contract formation and remedies. See
Bhala, supra note 74.
218. U.C.C. § 2-102(a)(23) (Tentative Draft Dec. 21, 1993) (emphasis added). Foreign
exchange transactions are not excluded from the definition of "goods" in the September
1993 Draft.
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writing signed or record authenticated by a party against whom enforcement is sought .... "219 This change-a complete rejection of the tangibility paradigm-would, of course, meet the needs of foreign exchange
market participants.
A more radical proposal regarding Article 2 is to revise it according to
a "hub-and-spoke" model. 220 Core rules applicable to all contracts would
form the hub from which spokes would emanate. The spokes would set
forth principles designed for special transactions. Conceivably, one spoke
could apply to foreign exchange transactions. The pragmatic strategy
could support this radical approach if major provisions of Article 2, in
addition to the statute of frauds, are not applied to the currency bazaar
context.
B.

The United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of
Goods ("CISG")

A literal reading of Articles 1(1) and 2(d) of the CISG makes it impossible to argue that the scope of the CISG encompasses foreign exchange
transactions. Article 1 (1) states that the CISG applies to "contracts of sale
of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States,"
but Article 2(d) excludes sales of money from the Convention. 221 Unlike
U.C.C. section 2-105(1), Article 2(d) does not distinguish between money
that is the subject of the contract (the commodity leg) and money that is
used as payment (the payment leg). CISG Article 2(d) also fails to mention "things in action."
The crude scope clause in the CISG is unfortunate because the way in
which the CISG resolves the enforceability problem serves the needs of the
currency bazaar. There is no statute of frauds in the CISG-here again
rejecting the tangibility paradigm. Article 11 of the CISG states that "[a]
222
contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing."
Thus, if the CISG applies to the Citibank-DBS dispute, then Citibank cannot argue that the dollar-yen contract is unenforceable. Moreover, questions about tape recordings as evidence of a contract, costs associated with
written confirmations, and potential difficulties arising under Article 19 of
219. U.C.C. § 2-201 (Tentative Draft Dec. 21, 1993). The September 1993 Draft contains
essentially the same revision of Section 2-201 as the December 1993 Draft.
220. See U.C.C. REV. ART. 2 (Discussion Draft Feb. 10, 1994); Nimmer, supra note 10.
221. CISG, supra note 13, at 672. The States must be Contracting States (i.e., they have
ratified or acceded to the CISG), or the applicable choice of law rules must lead to the
application of the law of a Contracting State. Pursuant to CISG Article 95, the United States
has taken a reservation to the choice of law provision. See id. at 693; MAR-TNDALE-HUBBELL,

supra note 13, at IC-35; Smart supra note 13, at 1344-46. Under Article 6, parties are free to
exclude the application of the CISG. CISG, supra note 13, at 673.
222. CISG, supra note 13, at 674. However, under CISG Article 96, a state can take a
reservation to Article 11 if the law of that state provides that contracts must be in writing. Id.
at 693-94. (Article 96 refers to "legislation" which presumably means that the law must take
the form of a statute or civil code.) If a party to a sales contract has its place of business in a
reserving state, then CISG Article 11 is inapplicable. Id. at 674 (Art. 12). Argentina, Belarus,
Chile, China, Hungary, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine have taken reservations
under CISG Article 96 to Article 11. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 13, at IC-34 to IC-
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the CISG (the provision on the battle of the forms) are irrelevant. In sum,
the CISG's resolution of the enforceability problem strongly suggests that
the scope of the CISG should cover the Citibank-DBS dispute.
The literal language of CISG Article 2(d) remains problematic, however, thus requiring a new judicial interpretation of that Article. For example, a court could find that a distinction is implied between commodity
leg and payment leg monies. Yen are the subject of the contract and
"goods" for purposes of determining the scope of the CISG. This finding
is not unprecedented. In In re Midas Coin Co., the court distinguished between those coins sold as a commodity for numismatic purposes and those
coins used as a means of payment. 2 23 The Midas court was confronted
with the definition of "goods." Like the CISG definition, the court noted
without further elaboration that the term " 'includes all things which are
movable .

.

. but does not include money.'

"224

Here again, a court that renders a Midas-type decision under the
CISG may be criticized for engaging in judicial activism or subscribing to
results-oriented jurisprudence. 2 25 The global nature of the currency bazaar, however, remains. Many foreign exchange transactions cross international borders.22 6 The participants in different countries will benefit
from the lack of a statute of frauds and from certainty that the CISG applies to their transactions, instead of wondering which country's contract
law governs.
C.

Private Contract Law

The outstanding example of private contract law in the currency bazaar is the International Foreign Exchange Master Agreement
("IFEMA").227 Strictly speaking, there is no problem of scope under this
law. Scope is a matter for the parties to decide. Parties can freely enter
into the master agreement and designate the foreign exchange transactions that they want covered therein. Thus, for instance, Citibank and
DBS can sign the IFEMA and indicate that it will govern dollar-yen spot
228
transactions between their respective New York and Singapore offices.
When a dispute arises concerning a transaction governed by the
IFEMA, the scope problem resurfaces. The dispute must be resolved not
by the IFEMA, but by interpreting the IFEMA under some other sales law
regime, whether it be U.C.C. Article 2, revised Article 2, or the CISG.
223. 264 F. Supp. 193, 197-98 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Zuke v. St. Johns Community Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968). The application of Article 2 to such transactions is
not controversial. See, e.g., Morauer v. Deak & Co., 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1142
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1979) (applying Article 2 to the sale of gold and silver foreign coins).
224. Midas, 264 F. Supp. at 195 (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-105(1)(f) (Vernon 1965).
225. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 18.
227. See IFEMA, supra note 14.
228. Alternatively, they could specify that the IFEMA governs spot transactions in all currencies between these two offices, spot transactions between multiple offices of Citibank and
DBS, or some other category of transactions and offices.
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Therefore, the IFEMA does not necessarily afford the parties certainty as
to whether their transactions are enforceable.
The utility of the pragmatic approach again becomes evident;
whether a particular sales law should govern the disputed transaction
should depend on whether that law meets the needs of the parties. The
IFEMA expressly states that in the event of a dispute between the parties as
to the terms of their transaction, the tape recording is "the preferred evidence" of the terms, "notwithstanding the existence of any writing
[namely, the IFEMA] to the contrary." 229 This provision, which states that
market participants signing the IFEMA agree in writing to be bound by230a
tape recording, parallels the criterion from Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein.
Accordingly, if the Bernstein holding is adopted by the Court in the Citibank-DBS dispute, then those parties may be afforded greater certainty
as to the enforceability of their foreign exchange trades.
Regardless of the IFEMA applicability, the disputed dollar-yen transaction would be enforceable under either revised Article 2 or the CISG
because a statute of frauds is absent under both regimes. This result suggests that including foreign exchange transactions governed by the IFEMA
within the scope of revised Article 2 or the CISG would support market
needs. A different result is reached with respect to U.C.C. Article 2. A
court may feel compelled to accept Citibank's defense that the IFEMA
does not satisfy the minimal writing requirements of section 2-201 (1). It
certainly qualifies as a "writing" under section 1-201(46) and is "signed"
according to section 1-201(39). 2 31 Uncertainty remains, however, as to
whether the IFEMA must state the quantity of currency purchased, and if
so, whether the IFEMA meets that requirement.
Arguably, the statute of frauds does not require that a writing state a
quantity term, because there is no reference to such a term in section 2201. Moreover, official comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-201 indicates that
"[a]ll that is required is that the writing afford a basis for believing that the
offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction." A liberal construction
suggests that a quantity term is not essential for the establishment of an
enforceable contract. 2 32 If true, then all of the transactions covered by
the IFEMA are enforceable.
229.

IFEMA, supra note 14, § 8.3.

230. 348 F. Supp. 1212, 1228 (D. Colo. 1972).
231. An interesting question arises as to whether the IFEMA is nothing more than a manifestation of intent to enter into a contract or is the contract itself.
232. See Caroline N. Bruckel, The Weed and the Web: Section 2-201's Corruptionof the U.C.C. 's
Substantive Provision - The Quantity Problem, 1983 U. ILL. L. Rav. 811 (1983). Professors
White and Summers adopt a similar approach: "a close reading of Section 2-201 indicates
that all commentators may be wrong. An alternative interpretation is that only if the writing
states a quantity term is that term determinative." WHrIE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, at 76
n.12; see also American Original Corp. v. Legend, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 962, 966 (D.Del. 1986)
(finding that the word "all" is sufficient to create an output contract under the statute of
frauds and that parol evidence may be admitted to ascertain the exact amount); Riegel Fiber
Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784, 789 n.ll (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that under the
White and Summers reading, if a quantity term is present, then it controls, but if no quantity
term is contained in the writing, then the party seeking enforcement of the agreement can
establish the term by parol evidence).

1994]

GLOBAL CURRENCY BAZAAR

This construction, however, conflicts with the plain meaning of a different passage from the same official comment: "The only term which
must appear is the quantity term which need not be accurately stated but
recovery is limited to the amount stated."2 33 In the context of the currency bazaar, the "quantity term" refers to the amount of currencies
bought or sold. Yet, parties sign the IFEMA before negotiating or concluding any particular spot transaction. The IFEMA cannot predetermine
234
how many yen Citibank purchases from DBS in a particular transaction.
Consequently, no master agreement can be effective against Citibank's
2 35
statute of frauds defense.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Private contract law does not resolve the problems of scope and enforceability. It simply leads judges, regulators, and market participants
back to U.C.C. Article 2, revised Article 2, or the CISG. With respect to
Article 2, absent legislative modification or judicial re-interpretation, the
statute of frauds and associated tangibility paradigm are inimical to the
technology and business practices of the currency bazaar. This fact is
strong, but not conclusive, evidence that including foreign exchange
transactions in the scope of Article 2 is at variance with the needs of market participants. Thus, the pragmatic strategy suggests that Citibank's defense under the statute of frauds should be rejected. It indicates that
DBS's response to that defense, while perhaps an over-reaction, has merit.
With respect to revised Article 2 and the CISG, the pragmatic strategy
suggests that it may be appropriate to include the foreign exchange transactions in the scope of these regimes. They properly reject the tangibility
paradigm. Because these sales laws omit a statute of frauds, neither revised Article 2 nor the CISG renders important transactions in the global
currency bazaar, like the Citibank-DBS dollar-yen deal, unenforceable.

233. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1. The same requirements for a writing apply to § 2-201(1) and
(2). To be sure, the official comment is deceptively simple. In effect, more may be required
in a writing in order to satisfy the statute of frauds. See FARNswoRTH,supra note 159, § 6.7, at
409 (stating that the identity of the parties and the nature, subject matter, and the essential
terms of the contract must be expressed).
234. Indeed, there is no separate quantity clause in the IFEMA. The definition of "FX
Transaction" refers to a transaction between the parties "of an agreed amount" of one currency in exchange for another currency. IFEMA, supra note 14, § 1, at 4. Section 3.1 discusses the obligation of each party to deliver an "amount" of currency. Id. at 7.
235. The uncertainty is compounded by the fact that, assuming a quantity term is required, it is not clear what types of phrases constitute a "quantity term." At one extreme is a
general quantity clause such as "a quantity of yen to be determined." The polar opposite is a
specific quantity term, such as "120 million yen." The issue in choosing these alternatives (or
some intermediate language) is whether to adopt "a mechanical construction of the quantity
language of section 2-201 (1)." Bruckel, supra note 174, at 815. For example, a mechanical
construction is used in New York. See Int'l Commercial Resources, Ltd. v. Jamaica Pub. Serv.
Co., 612 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that even though the total dollar
amount of a transaction was established, a writing that referred to "various goods that [defendant] intends to purchase" and "various material and equipment" lacked a quantity term
and, therefore, did not satisfy the statute of frauds) (citations omitted).

